University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

8-2006

Hate: Juror Perceptions of Crime Classification,
Attributions of Blame, and Impact of Extra-Legal
Factors
Karyn M. Plumm

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Plumm, Karyn M., "Hate: Juror Perceptions of Crime Classification, Attributions of Blame, and Impact of Extra-Legal Factors" (2006).
Theses and Dissertations. 697.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/697

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

HATE: JUROR PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME CLASSIF!Cf.. TION,
ATTRIBUTIONS OF BLAME, AND IivIPACT OF EX:TRA.-LEGAL FACTORS

by

r::aryn ivL Pl umm
B:iehelor of Arts, University of North Dakota, :WOO
· Master of Arts, TJniversity of N01ih Dakota, 2004 ·

A ~Jjssertation
3ubmitted to the. Graduate Faculty

c,f the

University of North Dakota
in partial fulfilhnent of the requfrements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

G;-,.-u1d Forks, North Dakota
August

2006

This dissc:rtnt!on, submittc:d hy Karyn M. Plumm in partial fulfilJment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University oi'North
Dakota~ hasb~cn read by thft Facn!ty Advisory Committee under whom the work has
been dorn~ and is hereby approved.

This cHssertation r11.eets the standards for appearance, contemns to the style and
format requirements Df the Graduate School of the Cniversity of North Dakota~ and is
hereby approved.

·

II

PERM!SSJON

Title

Hate: Juror Perceptions of Crime Classification, Attributions of·
Blame and Lnpact of Extra-1,egal Factors

Department

Psychology

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a
graduate degree fr0m the University of North Dakota, I agrct~ that the library of this

University shaJ! make it freely nvnilablc for inspection. [ further agree thnt pem1ission
for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who
supervised my dissertation work or, in he~~ absence, by the chairp~rson of the department
or the dean cf the Graduate SchooL It is understood that any copying or publkation or
other use of this dissertation or part thereof for financial g&in shall not be allowed without
my \V:ritten pennission. It is also urt.derstood that du~ recognition shan be given to me
and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made e;f any
material in my dissertation.

Signature
Date

lll

TABLE OF CONTENTS
'LIST OF FIGURES .................. ,. .................................. , ............... ·...... ;.·.vi

I,IS'I' ()'F 'rABf... ES. ~ .......... ·...... ·................. ' ... ·.......... I., .... ,,, ..... ' .........

i •••••

vii

·i\CKNOWLEDGMENl'S ............. ·............... ; ...................... , ................. viii

l\BS'"fI{ACT .............................·...................................................... ~ ... ix
CHAPTER

l.

IN1.,R0DlJCTifJN ............................................................... ,.

II.

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH PROORAM ............................... 15

III.

S'fUDY. . ONE ............................... ; ................................... 21

,. , .
P. urpose ................................................................ .L. l
I\t1eth<,)d .................................................................22

Results ........................ ;, ...................................... .. 215
Discussion ....................•....................................... 28

l\'.

ST'UDY TW0 ...... ; ......................................... , .................... 32
Pttr_{)ose ................................................................32

Method .............. ; ................................................. 34
Results .......................................... ; ...................... 37
Discussion ............................................................. 40

V.

STUDY TfIREE ..................................................................... 46
Purpose ....................... '. ........................................ 46

lV

~A Ct h() J .................................................. ·............... ;·. 47
1-lc~ults ... '·' .......... , ......... ; .............,.... ,· ....................... 50

Discussion ......... ,:,; .............. ; ................................ .53
VI.

GENERAL DmCUSSION ... ; .................................................. 54

.c\.P.PEl. IDICES ........................... , ................................ , ..................... 66
R:._EFERENCES ..................•. , ........................ , ...................... ; ............. 123

V

LlSTOF FIGURES

Figure
1.

Page

Reasonableness of dcfend&nt's actions; study two.~: ... ·........................... 62

.

VJ

'

LIST OF TABLES
Table

l~age

I.

· Frequency TabJe, Personal Decision Statements; Study 1........................ 63

2.

Frequency Table, .Personal Dedsion Statements; Study 2, ...................... 64

3.

FrequencyTable, Personal DecisionStatemcnts; Study 3 .................•..... 65

Vll

ACKNOWLEDGMHNTS ·
1 would like to express my sincere appreciation for the time and effort put forth by
my committee members, Dr. James Antes, Dr. Douglas Peters, Dr. J. Doug McDonald,

and. Dr. Kara vVettersten, in the preparation of this dissertation. I would !ike to give
special thanks to my advisor, m~ntor, and chair of mydissertation committee, Dr. Cher1l
Terrance, for her patience, dedication, and support.

I would also like to nott~ the research assistants without \Vhom these studies would

not ha\,ebcenconducted in a timely manner. Thanks to Heather Ellingson, Bethany
Reuter, Rachel Moericke, Tom Kopp, Rachel Ncmgar nnd Vanessa Henderson. One final
thanks to my friends and family who supported me throughout this entire process.

VllJ

ABSTRACT
A jury simulation paradigm was employed in this series of studies exploring hate
crime. In the first two studies., crim~ label (i.e., bias-motivated assault ·vs. first degree

assault) and v>.tim gender were varied within the context of a sexual orientation
motivated (study 1) or gender motivated (study 2) hate crime scenario. Results from the
first study indicated that attributions of blame against the victim varied as a function of
participants' attitudes toward minority sexual orientation. Results of study two indicated

that participants in the assault condition were more likely to nnd the defendant guilty
.

.

'

'

than those in tlw hate crime condition .. Participant!~ in study 1.wo also made differential
attributions of victim blame depending on cdme 1abeC such that those inthe assault
·condition found the victim to be more mentally unstable and they also found the

defcndai1t to be mote reasonable than those in the hate crime condition.
Jurors in the thJrd study read a trnnscript depicting an attack on a gay man by a
man in either a local bar (i.e., not a gay bar) or a gay bar. Within location conditions,
jurors were presented with either "provocation" by the victim (i.e., c.~kjng the perpetrator
to dance and putting his arm around him) or alternatively no ''provocation" wos
presented ..Results of study three 1ndicated significant differences of victim blame
depending upon condition. Participants in the local bar and "provocation~' µresent
co.nditions were more likely to blame the victim for the attack than those in the gay bar or
"provocation" absent conditions. Implications for hate crime law and attribution theory

wjthin the courtroom are discussed.

IX

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Hate crimes have been the topic of nmch debate among political, psychological

nnd legal schotars. Arguments about determining a biased intent, policing the right of
people to feel ho\\' they wish, and measuring a hypothetical constmct uuch as "hate" have
. all been arguments against the use of hate crime lavvs. Arguments Jor establishing such

statutes are rclatc<l to the nature of what hate crimes cntaiJ and tl1e nc·~cssity to have
harsher penalties in piace for perpetrators of such crime.
A hate crime can be defined as one in which the victim is sc1ected because of his
or her actual or perceived race, color~ religion, disability, sexual orientation, or national
origin (U.S. Department of Justice, 1990); Hate crimes differ from other crimes in that

they typically involve excessive violence, are committed against strangers, are often not .
planned are typically comrnitted by young, white males, and may involve more than one
1

offender (Do\vney & Stage, 1999). As a result of the 1990 Hate Crime Statistics Ac1
(U.S. Department of Jmtice, 1990), state and federal agencies began collecting data en
the number and type of hate crimes that were bdng committed.
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) reported a dramatic im;rease in the
number of reported hate crimes in the year following the stat~stics act (FBI, '2001 \
Although the :mmber of overall crimes increm. cd slightly behveen 2000 and

~,jv},

hate

crimes rose from a total of 8,063 in 2000 to 9,730 in 2001 (FBI, 2001). Since the FBJ ·
began collecting hate crime statistics in J 991, repotied hate crimes based on sexual

orientation more than tripled. In the FBI's rnost recent hate crim(~S statistic report, hate
crimes based on sexual orientation remain in the top three ot'allthc reported hate crimes

categorics.(FBI,2001). Because crimes based on sexual orientation are underreported due
to fear (Herek, 1989), these shr~istics may not adequately represent the breadth of biased

crimes based on se/\.ual orientation.
Follmving obtained re~ults of collected datR on bias-motivated crime, hate crime
. sentencing enhancement was put into place (Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act,
1993). Sentence enhancement w~s viewed as necessary due to the characteristlcs of hate·
crimes thatwere identified. That is, hate crimes although typically committed agriin3t
one person are directed at the group to which th.··. ~ ·'-"rson is perceived ~ belonging to,
having negative implications then not only for eac1' individual victim of such crimes bui

for their commu11ity a11Cl society as a Whol,~ by creating; fear among members oftarectcci
groups.
Although a number of states now include hate crime legal statutes, some still
exclude particular groups from protection under these laws. The state of Minnesota is
· one of ten st.ates (plus the District of Columbia) to include specific hate crin._e laws based

on sexual orientation and gender identity (National Gay and Lesbian Ta1,k Force, 2005).
Because of the nature of hate crimes (i.e., excessive violence, hate for gronp directed at
one group member), it is not surprising that they have a lasting impact on the victimswho

have exi.,erie .1ced such a crim\! (Herek, 1994).
1

Attitudes Toward Hate Crime Laws
Numerous objections to hate crime statutes advanced by psychologists and legal

scllo1ars have been the ba~is for much debate over hate crime laws. Gcrstenteld ( 1992)

2

argued th{\,t the impact ot' hate crirrw law ls only u :.;yrnho1ie uU·~mpt at reducing btgotry.
·She noted tLat the trn.:~j<H' problem~ v1ith this type of 'cgblation are the diffi',;·:ilties
surrou.;:,.ding the identification of these crimes, as well as the challenges of considering Li-ie
0ffender's motives. That is, although the collection of information on :mte crimes b now
required, it is still difficult, if not impossible to identify why

'.l

perpetrntDr commits a

crime. Although the crime may tie called "hate," there arc a number of 'Jtht.:i' reu~ons the
perpetrators of such crimes may be ct1mmitting them. Fear, ignorance, misunderstanding,
ang<3ror hate m'1y all be motivatic:r. for a person to commit a crime against c.nother. Bias-

motivated cfonc (i .c., hntc crime) however tends to br, directed at a group of people cvcP
though an individual is targeted. There are m,my situational variables that may play r.
ro]e in an attack on an in . . ~1vidual (i.e., they may be perceived as belonging to a ~ocial
group ir:

,1

:i.mmbc:r of ways). It is in these cases that teasing apart what constitutes hate

crime from other types of crime becomes diffi,:.ult. Beyond situational fr~tors,
inccnsistr-mt ways of col:~r.ting, reporting~ and analyzing data betvveen federal~ st.ate and
local law enforcement make the label of bias-motivated crime (hate crime) seem more

figurative than literal.
GuHaway (?.004) discnssed the n.wny objections both psychology and legal

scholars have to hate crime law. WbHe some are based in constitutional law (i.e., it is
uncon~titu.tional to regulate how someone thinks or feels about someone else), others
concern meas11rement of motivation and intent. Furthen11ore, although an inciividunl may
he motivated to commit a clime, he or she may have no intent to do so; and even if she or

he had intent to commit a crime, he or she may not nctually follow through. 'fh(refore
distinctions between these constructs (:.c., motival·ion and intent) and the culpable

3

behavior Gf cl"in1inals bccr)mc difficult 11) identify. Tho:;c ·who criticizchnt0 crime law
from a psycto!ogical perspective a!',_;ue that they ace flawed b~1.jause of th<.: itnpossibility
to 1~1ensure bias. In this sense therefore\ the rclatj01rnhip betwrx~n attitude:~ and behavior
cannot br; stated as causal. Crimi!1al law, however, tends to draw a line between

motivation and intent (mens rea), intent being rnore closely tied to behavior. In the
instance of hate crimes, however, i+ becomes difficult to tease them apart (Sullaway,
':.004).
Despite these concerns, SuHaway (2004) hrg1-1ed that bias-motivated assault~ as a

fom1 of criminal activity~ does serve the purpose of reducing such crimes as ·well as
increasing awareness of the unacceptability of such bd1aviors. Noaethclcss, PetrosinD
( 1999) argued that hate crimes will become more difficult to prevent and wiJl occur more

frequently. Despite this, it may be the case that simply giving these acts the crimi.1al

labd of bias-motivated crime (i.e., hate crime) may not 0·111 serve to increase awareness
about the unacceptability of such behavior, but may also lead to reduction in biaming the
victim and therefore increase convictions for these types ofcrime.
Jacobs and Potter ( 1998) discussed yet other areas of debate over hate crime laws.
including justification and enforcement of these· 1aws. They outlined the reasons hate

crime offenders are viewed by psychvio.~y and legal scholars as "more culpable." These
reasons include the disproportionate severity of t~::>e types of attacks, both phys1caily

a11d psychologically, on their victims and the impact ot hate crimes on third parties (i.e.~
reinforcing social division and hatred). Jacobs 2nd Potter ( 1998) a!so identified probl~ms
with enforcing hate crirhe laws, including Jack of inforrnation in the area of jury research.

In fact~ it has been noted that only 9% to 16% of reported hate crime acts end in arrest,

4

wit Leven fewer being prosecuted (Jacobs & Potter, 1998). Ignorance ahout the reasons
why an al lcgcd hate crim~ perpetrator may be arrested

but not prosccute<l only augments

these sma!l numbers of prosecutions. Because little re~carch has been done in the arc:;tof
juror deeision-making, very little is known about why fact-finders (i.e., judges and jurors)
reach the decisions they are reaching and what factors within the trial have an influence
on these decisions.
Perceptions of Hate Crimes

Hate crimes represent a distinct type of crim,~ unlike other types ofcriminal
activity. Because they are primarily bas~d on the victim's membership in a demographic
group, the motivation behind perpetration of such a crime may not only be different than
that of other crimes, but may be perceived differently by other:-, as well. Indeed,

perceptions of hate crimes appear to vary according

to not only the type of crime

involved but extra-legal factors such as race and gender as well.
In m1 effort to understand how people view hate crimes, Craig and Waldo ( 1996)
explored the definitions of such crime:s by asking young adults to describe their
perceptions of what a typical hate cjme consisted of They found that participants
viewed a typical hate crime as involving violence or assault, including a member of a
minority group, and as being m.otivated by fear, anger or ignorance. Although these
views are accurate, other assumptions participants stated in this study were not.
F&i.icipants were able to point out what encapsulates a typical hate crime but did not
identify other types of hate crime nor did they correctly state that the victims in these
types of crimes were innocent. In other words~ participants viewed the victims as at least

partially responsible for their victimization. It appeurs then that certain crin:1es mHy fo.il

5

to be defined as a "hate crime~ on the basis of failing to fit. notions of i.vhat typical ~ate
crimes mvoJve.
To further expl'-)rc ptrccptions of hate crime~ Craig a.nd Waldo ( J 906) also asked

about perceptions of punishment for perpetrators of hate crimes. They found that
participants rated the likelihood of punishment for hate crimes motivated by heterosexism

to be less than hate crimes motivated by other prejudices (i.e.~ anti-Semitism, racism).
Participants viewed hate crimes based on sexual orientation as less Ukelyto be punished,
arguably because of a socially accepted prejudice against homosexua1ity.

Furthermore, Dunbar and Molina (2004) found that college student participants

had a generally positive attitude toward hate crime laws (i.e., were in favor of such laws
being in place in the state in which they lived). Nonetheless, it may be that such positive
attitudes extend to only certain types of hate crime. In one of the few jury simulation
studies examining hate crimes, perceptions.of hate crime (assessed by certainty of guilt)
varied as a function of the race of the victim and perpetrator (Marcus.;.Newhall~ Blake &

Baumarm, 2002). Results indicated that certainty of guilt was highest when the victim
\\:as African American and the perpetrator was Caucasian. It may be the case that

certainty of guilt reflected the stere,)typical nature of this crime (i.e.,. certain scenarios
more easily fit the typical idea of a hate crime than other scenarios).
Differential perceptions of such crimes may have an impact on juror decision-

making in the courtroom. Consistent ·with this, Johnson and Byers (2003) found that the
major factor detennining acceptance or rejection of general hate crime laws was wheth~r
or not sexual orientation would be inciuded as a protected bias. They reported that those

. who wanted inclusion of protection for gay men and lesbians would support such a la'N in

6

their stutc~ while thos<.': who did not want incJu~:don would oppose such a law. Clearly
then, attitudes toward lesbians and gay men may play an important role in perceptions of
lmte crime.

Attitudes Toward Lesbians, Gay :M.cn, and Bisexuals
Lesbians and gay men have a long history of persecution and have been consistent
targets ofpr~jvdice, stereotypes, and discrimination (Yang, 1997). Many researchers
have looked at the negative attitudes endorsed by heterosexual men and women toward
gay men and lesbians. Overall, Kite and \Vhitley (1994) found that both heterosexual

men and women held negative attitudes toward homosexual men and wom~n.
Hcterose:< uo 1 men however were more negative than women toward gay men, lesbians

and hornm;cxual behavior. These findings remained consistent in follow-up studies with

the added finding that gay men were rated more negatively than lesbians hy both
heterosexual men and women (LaMar & Kite, 1998). LaMar & Kite (1998) explained

this finding in terms of a generalized gender-role belief. They stated th.at men are
expected to hold a stronger rejection of sex-role violations whereas women are allowed
greater latitude with sex-role violations. Therefore, social stereotypes may dictate a

stronger acceptance of icsbians than of gay men.
Whitley (2001) reported similar findings of negative at1itudes toward gay men

and lesbians; pointing out that the best predictors of these attitudes were gender (i.e.,
males held more negative attitudes than females), endorsement of gender rale norms,

negative attitudes 'toward wornc·1, anG sexist hcliefs. Herek (] 989) pointed out that

although other types of hate crime victims (i.e.~ raciaJ; ethnic, religious) suffer from

similar prejudkes, the impect of overt discrimination and intolerance is unique to gay

7

people as government, religious and soda! institutions ofo:.'.n condone pr\;"judiccs held
against them. For example~ denying gay men at1d lesbian:. Lhc right to marry and hearing .

certain religious groups state that homosextmHty is a sin sends the message to the general
pubHc that discrimination against this pruiicular group is;

::t

some level, acceptable.

Moreover, these condoned negative attitudes risk being aci.cd upon in the form of
physical aggression (D' Augelli, 1989).
Hie impact of sexual-,orientation based hate crimes on the victims of these crimes

has been widely studied within the realm of hate crime literature. Victimization of
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals (LOB) has been linked to

:1.

number of problems for the

victim following the attack. Victimization (i.e., ridicule, physical atiacks) during
childhood for LOB individuals has been associated with a number of mental health

problems (Remafedi, Farrow & Deisher, 1991; Shaffer, Fi~hcr, Hicks, Parides & Gould,
1995). Rivers (1996) stated that LGB yout:hs who experie1H:e victimization due to their
sexual orientation are at greater risk for suicidal behavior.

i

it~orge and Behrendt (1988)

suggested that lower self-esteem among victimjzed LGB. b_i lviduals is correlated with
difficulties in maintaining_ intimatc·relationships. Herek (l ()94) also reported that
crimina] victimization (i.e., vandalism of personal property, physical attacks) has
t..~gative impacts onthe victims of such crime, such as emo, .~mal and cognitive problems

(e.g., depression, anxiety), somatic disturbances (e.g., physical injury related to the crime,
sleep disturbances), behavioral problems (e.g., suicidal iclc,·.t\lrm), and interpersonal
problems (e.g., avoidance of social contacts).
The patterns of victimization among LOB individu~d.·: have beencomparcd tc that

of rape victims (Rivers & D' Augelli, 2001 ). Tn fact, victim-: uf hate crime assaults are

s

nftcn. hJnmcu und characterized as deserving their attack in much the samt! way that rape
victin1s have been (Hcn:k, 1(J94). However, along with the dii'cct impact that.
victimization has on an individual, sccond,iry victimizatiOn (i.e., being outed) is alF:o a
problem for LOB individuals. They may often find themselves in situations of
discrimination from those who learned about their sexu3l orientation as a result of the
attack. This scenario may lead to further impacts such as loss of employment, child

cut,wdy, or relationships (Herek, 1994). Further~ the impact of secondary victimization is
wh8t may prevent reporting of some hate crimes.

Despite the negaiive consequences associated with hate crimes perpetrated against

LGB individuals, little research has cxarnincd people's perceptions of sexual-orientation
based hate ~rime in the courtroom. In fact, Jacobs and Potter (1998) pointed out the
many ways in which enforcing and prosecuting hate crime laws have not only failed but

have led to no further knowledge about the contributlons of having such laws in place.
Many special interests groups (e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Jewish Defense League,
NY City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project) maintain that hate crime legislz.tion is

an important legal issue to help gain equality, yet they do not have much data from law
enforcement or prosecution records about how a hate crime is dealt with in the current
legal system. Of the crime statistics that are reported, the number of arrests and/or

prosecutions for bias-motivated assault are quite low (i.e., ranging from 9% to 16% of
reported crimes ending in anest or prosecution; Jacobs & Potter, 1998).
There are many speculations as to why perpetrators of hate crimes are not arrested

and/or charged for t!1eir crime (e.g., police indifference, crime not recognized as biasmotivated). However, the reasons a perpetrntor may be arrested and charged wHh a hate

9

crime but not pros<.~cntcd remain equivocal. h.,·. . ights into how people define and attribute
.biame for hate crimes may be helpful in this regard. In order for the legal system to bring

a perpetrator to trial on charges or bb!Hnotivated as:-mult, they must be able to prove their
case to a jury. Since there is no published research in the area of juror decision-making
when it comes to bias-motivated assault (based on sexual o.rientation), prosecutors and
defenders are left to try and find the least biased jury through voir dire questioning, in
which jurors often lie (Ginger) 1990). Trying to find the least biased jury poses a
problem for both prosecutors and defenders, especially when they are unaware of what

factors may influence juror decision-·rnaking in such cases.
Attribution Theory
There are many reasons why someone deciding the guilt or innocence of a person

who is accused of committing a crime may make their decision. One of the factors
considered by these fact-finders (i.e., judges, jurors) is how much blame or responsibility

the person accused of c·)mrnitting a crime holds for the event that took place. There are

many different theories about how people attribute blame or responsibility to certa~
parties (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Schachter, 1964; Bem, 1967,
1972; Vv einer 1979, 1985). What all of these theories have in common is the idea that all ·
people try to fom1 causal explanations for events that have occurred. As social perceivers
we arrive at judgments based on the infonnation we have (i.e., what areas are most
important to us in making our decision) and how we combine it.
According to Kelley (1972), people try to understand ~~he cause of an event by

looking at evidence in three areas: its consistency over time (i.e., Whether or not it has
happened in similar situations), its distinctiveness (i.e., whether or not it has happcr1cd

JU

before), and other people's experiences with iL However, this type or (' 1i<lencc is
1

typically notavai.luble in most

Cll~CS.

Rather.

(/it_;

only infonnution

VvC 111:Jy

have is the

singie occurrence of the event itself. This situation is salient in the courtroorn where
previous evidence, charg::)s, or convictions are not allowed to

oc used against a person

accused of a crime. Therefore, jurors are left with only the sinr~J.e case on which to base
their judgment.

In cases such as this, Kelley (1972) argued that people will gi·ve· more weight to a .
facilitative cause (something that promotes that particular event) than to an inhibitory
cause (something that would weaken or undermine that particular event). This theory

combined with Heider's (1958) contribution of the distinction between internal
(generated by the person} or external ( caused by the sit11ai.ion) atlributi0ns is what leads

to errors in attribution. There are many attribution biases and errors that have been
identified (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967; Jones & Nisbett, 19'71 ). At the heart of these
different eftects is the fundamental attribu.tfon error (FAE).

The FAE states that when the perceiver is attempting to judge an ev~nt, he or she

will overestimate dispositional (internal) attributions and underestimate situational
(external) attributions when judging the behavior of others involved in that event. It may

be the case that because so little infonnation is typically available to the perceiver that
she or he simply looks at faciWative and internal causes for the event. However, studies
have shovvn(Trop\~) 1986; Trope, Cohen & Maoz, 1988) that even when the perceiver has
some of the information he or she would use to make caus2l explanrttions, she or he may
still categorize the event, the situation in which it occurs, and the prior information he or
she has about the person she or he is judging in terms of disposition-relevant behavior.

11

~{i1nply rmt, the inl'orrnation they arc f!athering i:.\ heing 11scd lo dceide whether or not th iii

person is good or bad. Using this information ;·athcrthanthe situation in ciec,ding
whether or not someone would (or shouJd) be held responsible for the cause of the event
is one such effect of the FAK This bias is said to stem in part from the actor-observer
effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1971 ).
The actor-observer effect explains that when one (the obserYer) is making a
judgment about another's (the actor) behavior, the observer tends to explain the actor's
behavior in terms of dispositional factors and her or his own behavior in terms of

situational fa.ctors. That is, we tend to ignore situational factors when explaining the
behavior

of others. Many studies have been conducted producing extensions and

qualifications
of the
actor-observer effect (Goldberg, 1978; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant &
.
.

Mamcek, 1973; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1985). One such extension conducted by Miller and
· Norman (1975) demonstrated that active onlookers ·would be even more inclined thnn
passive observers to attribute an actor's behavior to dispositional factors. Therefore,

members· of a jury may fall victim to the actor-observer effect more so than someone who
3imply witnessed the event take place. When deciding how to explain an event in most
situations, these biases and errors do not have much consequence for those involved.

However, for the defendant in a courtroom setting, these errors and biases may be of dire
consequence. Along with deciding how to explain an event, there are also errors made in

deciding who is to be hel<l responsible for an event, or taking it one step farther, who is to
blame.
Although attributions of rcsponsibiiity and attributions of blame both point out
who can be held accountable for outcomes of an event, they diffor slightly in that

12

attributions of blame arc typically reserved fc)r cases in which the causal agent (or- person
held respons.ible) is subjectto punishment for a negative event (McGraw, 1987).

Attribution of responsibility depends on the ability to identi.l~> the part1~~ular person who·
caused the event, the belief that the person should have been able to foresee the outcome,
the perception that the person's actions were not justified by the situation, and the belief
that the person acted out of free choice (McGraw, 1987). In the context of the courtroom
one might typjcally think of attributions of blame in the context of deciding whether or
. not someone is guilty of a crhnc. However this type of attribution (and its associui~d

errors and biases) may spill over into blaming the victim of a crime. If a decision-maker

. is mi.able to pinpoint certain aspects of the de fondant's behavior, or he or she feels that .
she or he may have acted in a similar fashion as the defendant in that situation (c.f:,
defensive attribution hypothesis, Burger, 1981 )~ he or she may attempt to locate
responsibility for the event in terms of the victim's behavior. Related to attributions of
blame for a victim is Lerner's (1970) just-world hypothesis which states that people have
a need to see the world as a controllable and fair place in which good things happen to
good people and bad things happen to bad people. This can lead to blaming the victim
through the belief that the person deserved what happened simply b~cause if she or he
were a good person the bad event would not have happened in the first place.
Attribution theory is applicable to any area in w~ich people are judging the

behavior of oi\er~. Examining pmiicular biases and err0rs may be especially helpful in
arena3 such as the courtroom, where it is someone's responsibility to judge the behavior

of others. In cGses such as hate crimes, unde1 ;;tanding which errors and biases are pr~sent
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when making attributions nnd how potential jurors use these attributions ~n deciding their

verdict may help shape the future of how others view hate crime and hate ..~rime laws.

l4

CH/\PTER il

OVERVIB W OF RESEAKCl-I PROGRAM
Very little research has been done on the juror decision-making process in BllY

type of hater.rime. As perceptions of fact-finders (i.e.,judges and jurors) are pivotal in
H1e courtroom for those cases tJ1at must be tried~ hov: ihey view and attriLute blame for

the cases they hear could alter how ~J~rpetrators are punished. With a h1story of
1

successful d~fenses such as "homosexual advance~' def~nse (Schick v. State, 1991 ) in

which an attack on a gay man was seen as justifiable, it is of utmost importance to know
how jw-ors arc influenced by the way the lcgt'l system views a crime.
One way jurors may know how the crime is viewed by the criminal justic. system

is by the label it .is given (i.e., first degree assault, bias-motivated assault, etc.) and the
choices they have to choose from when handing dovvn their decision and sentence (i.e.,

guiity of assault, not guilty, etc.). Although many studies have looked at attitudes toward
gay men and lesbians (Herek, 1989), the impact hate crimes have on theit victims (Herek,

1994; Rivers & D' Augelli, 1001 ), and attitudes toward hate crime laws (Johnson &

Byers, 2003; Miller, 2001) none have empirically .Jxamined the effect oflabeling a crime
as "hate" on juror perceptions of a bias-motivated crime based on heterosexism and those

involved.

1

The crise of Schick v. State (1991) involved the .nurder of a gay man. The facts of the case were that a

non~gay man solicited a sexual favor from a gayrnan and aflcnvard beat him to death. Defense in this case
claimed that th(:. non-gay man wa~ so shocked by his actions that his fear and angel' ovenvhelmed him and
therefor~ his behavior (beating a gay man to death) was justifiable. The jury in this case agreed and found

the defendant not-guilty.
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Giving a crime the label of "hale crimen curries with it the at;sumption behind
why the crime \Vas committed; that is, the perpetrator committed the crime against a

vic~im because of a negative bias towards the social group to which the victim belongs,
and further, that the perpetrator intern.Jed to inflict harm not only on that individual but
against that group as a whole. F11rthennore, hate crimes hold greater penalty for the
perpetrator than ifa crime were labeled as another type of crime (Hate Crime Sentencing

Enhancement Act, 1993) .. Implicitly then, a hate crin .c is considered more severe
because of why

it was committed than another type of crime.

This may lead fact finders

(i.e., judges and jurors) to attribute blame for the crime differently as well as penalize the

perpetrator more harshiy.
Study one sought to investigate the impact of labeling a crime on juror decisionmaking and attributions of the crime. As hate crimes have become a topic of mainstream
debate, it was anticipated that mock~jurors would make significantly different decisions

as well as attributions of the crime based on both the labeling of the crime and the
2

gender condition of the trial in which they were involved (i.e., gay man or lesbian). By

labeling the crime as bias-motivnted basec! on legal standards, it takes the onus off of the

juror to decide why the crime was committed. Using the label of hate crime may then
serve to reduce any attribution errors (e.g., blaming the victim) that may have been
employed by jurors when trying to decide their verdict. Therefore, it was hypothesize<l
that jurors within the "assault" labeled condition would be kss likely to find the
defendant guilt:.' than those in the "bias-motivatedn labeled condition. Furthermore,
consistent with stereotypes of gay men and lesbians it was anticipated that jurors would
2 The lcrm Sex" is typically used in reforencc to biological charactcristi ..:s. However, because people arc
oflen judged on the degiee to which they conform to culturally constrncted 1\otions of whnt it means to. be
male or fem~le, the term ''gender" will be used throughout this pnpcr.
14
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dttributc more blame for the crime to the forrwlc lhan to the rn.ale defendant. As has hcen
.

shown in cases such as S,;hick v.

.

State (J 991 ),

jurors may hold stereotypes ana)ogous to

"sexual. advance defense" in which they more readily see an attack on a gay man as

justifiable and in turn may more easily attribute blame to the femaic perpetrator than the
male perpetrator.
As the first study involved a scenario portraying a ('typical" hate crime (i.e.,
perpetrated against minority sexual orientation, involved violence and name-ca1Jing), it

was also of interest to examine a scenario that does not fit the ty~Jical notion of hate

cri1m.~. In fact, the inclusion of gender or sex as a category of hate crime is a topic of
much debate among law enforcement as well as kgal and psychology scholars. Although
the category has made its way into the statutes of some states (i.e.,

nc, CA, CO, CT, HI,

MD, MN, MO, NM, PA, VT) many argue that gender-based crimes (in most ci.ises,
crimes against women) fa.JI under domestic violence statutes rather than bias-motivated
crimes. Most domestk violence statutes include crimes against both women and men,

however it has been noted that crimes against men are often underreported and that these
statutes do not have a great success rate for conviction (U.S. Department of Justice,
2000). Another problem with induding gender--based crimes under domestic violence ·
statutes is that these statutes include only pmtners living together or sharing some fom1 of

domestic relationshir (~.e., they share children, they were once married).
Cases such as rape and battering of a non-domestic partner may very well fit into

hate crime statutes more readily than domestic violence statutes. Studies have suggested
that one of the factors that motivate mcfi to rape is hostility toward women (Dricschncr &

Lange, 1999; Zurbriggen, 2000). Because the motivation behind ,vhy the <..rime is being
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committed (i.e., a person ·hates.a group of' people with a 8imi'lar chnract.,.~ristic) is the
defining feature of a huti.~ c1.·imc1 it would ~;;c,;,:m then that gen<.for-basc<l cr.irlles may fall

under hate crime statutes.
To investigate perceptions of non-typical hate crimes, the second study examined
the impact of labeling a gender-based crime as assault or bias-motivated and varied the
gender of the victim. In this study, the gender of the victim and perpetrator we-re always
opposite. That is, both crimes against women perpetrated by men as well as crimes
against men perpetrated by women were examined. As the scenario in this study did not
fit the typical notion of a hate cri.1.1le, it was hypothesized that jurors in this study would

find the defendant guilty more often when the crime is labeled as assault than \Vhen it is
labeled as bias-mot~ vated (hate crime). Also, based on gender stereotypes that
characterize v.:omen as passive and men as aggressive, it was hypothesized that more
blame will be attributed to the female victim than to the male victim.
Taken together, the first two studies examined how victim gender and crime label
may influence juror decision-making in both typical (study 1) and non-typical (study 2)
hate cr;me scenarios. As extra-legal factors such as the location and events surrounding
the crime may play a role in how jurors perceive a typical (i.e., based on sexual
orientation) hate crime, the final study varied both the location and level of
"provocation 3" within the context of a bias-motivated crime based on sexual orientation.
The scenario in the final study was identical to that used h1 ~t~!~:,' 1 with the exception
that the event always involved two men, one who identified as heterosexual (the alleged

3

A!though it. is commonly believed that hnte crime victims may "provoke" the attack against them, it is
important to note that these crimes are inflicted rather than "provoked." To ensure that readers do not lose.
site of this distinctioa, the terms "provocation': and "provoked" will appear in quotations (Kristiansen &
Giulietti, 1990).
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perpetrator) and oncwl-w identified as h<)mo:~cxw11 (the alleged vietim), and the cdme
was referred to as a bias-,motivatcd assault(ba'cc ci'irnc) in all conditions. The conditions
that were altered involved location of the crime and ''provocation'~ on the pait of the

victin1. Spedfically, the scenarios read by mock~urors included information that the
alleged assault took place in either a local bar O.e.> not a gay bar) or in a gay bar. Within
location conditions, jurors read that the alleged victim either "provoked" the assauit b~,1

putting his arm around the alleged perpetrator and asking him to slow dance or
alternatively, he did not '~provoke,, the assault by simply vva!king away after talking wirh
the alleged perpetrator.

These types ofextra-legal factors may play a pivotal role in the decision-making
process on the part of mock-jurors in a case such as this. Approaching someone of the
same sex and asking him or her to dance may be seen as more justifiable in a setting such
as a gay bar where it might be expected. Jurors may therefore attribute more blame to the
perpetrator in that setting. As "provocation" may increase victim blaming on the part of
mock jurors, it was expected that in the "provocation'~ present condition, jurors will
attribute more blame to the victim.
Taken together, this program of research consisted of three studies aimed at
· examining factors that may play a role in juror decision-making in court trial cases

involving bias-motivated ac;suult (hate clime). These studies investigated such variables
as the court's labeling of the crime and victim gender in 00th typical and non-typical hate

crime scenarios as well as extra-legal factors such as location and ''provocation'' that may
alter decision-making and attribut{ons of blame. Overall, they may inform the legal field
about the aspects of certain types of crime (i.e., typical or non-·typical) that may have an
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impact on juror decision-making in these much debatr:d hate crime statutes. Finally, this
series of studies may also help fill a knowledge gap within the. vast area of attribution
theory and how ii cat1 be applied within the legal arena.
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CHAPTER HI
STUDY ONE
Purpose
Althougl1 many researchers have looked at attitudes toward gay men and lesbians

(Her<~k, 1989), the impact hate crimes have on their victims (Herek, 1994; Rivers &
D' Augelli, 2001), and attitudes toward hate crime laws (Johnson & Byers, 2003; Miller,
2001 ), none have investigated the labeling of the crime on juror v·~rdicts and attr;butions
of blame and responsibility in a bias-motivated crime committed against a gay mtm or
lesbian. The goal of this project was to better understand how potential jurors view hate

crime and how they attribute blame for the crime to the perpetrator, victim and situation.
Gaining knowledge as to how these crimes are viewed in the courtroom not only
addresses a gap in the knowledge base but may also provide better understanding of the
controversy that surrounds the idea of labeling a crime as Hhate"'. Although some may
see the label of '(hate'~ or even "bias-motivated" as infringing upon their rights to feel ·
how they want about a person or group of people, the effect of such a label may in tum
serve to highlight the difference between feeling how one wents to (i.e., upholding

constitutional rights) an'"~ committing criminal acts.
The central hypothesis of the current study was that the label hate crime versus
alternative labels of crime, would serve to reduce attribution en-ors, specifically victim
blaming, on the part of potential jurors as indicated by their verdict .and their ratings of

blame for the crime for both the victim and defendant in cases that fit the typical notion
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or what a hate crime is. Victim blaming rnay be rc:.duced by tl1(~

l~hel of "hate" bc~ng

added to a crime due to .the reason implied about the nature or lhe crime (i.e., tlwt the
perpetrator held prejudice against the victim) as opposed to other reasons jurors may

a.ttribute to the nature of the crime when other labels are used (e.g., the victim~s actions,
fear of the perpetrator, defense against sexual advance, etc.). Victim blaming may also

be influenced by jurors 1 attitudes toward gay men and lesbians in ca~es of bias-motivated
crimes due to het.erosexism.

Further understanding of hov.r blame is attributed ins\ h crimes may lend itself to
help shape public policy on how hate crime laws are developed, enforced and prosecuted
in the United States; Gaining knowledge about juror decision-making in such cases will

also,cncourage further work in this and related areas by both psychology and legal
scholars. This projF,.~ct explored the factors jnfluencing juror decision making in a case
involving bias-motivated assault (hate crime), specifically how the crime was labeled as

well as investigating how blame for the .crime was attributed to both the perpetrator and .

:<:tim inYolved in a hate crime.
Method

Participants
Participants (N=l 14) were recruited via follow-up phone calls after having filled
out a prescreen questionnaire measuring level of heterosexis111 in an undergraduate
·ychology course. Participants were asked to play the part of mock-jurors in a study on
i·ccptions of crime. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditio·ns stemming
from a '2 (label: assault vs. hate crime) x 2 (victim gender: gay man vs. lesbian) factorial

I.

i

Of the pruiicipants, the sample included 79 women. Participants' ages ranged
from 1°8--41, with a majority (31 % ) of participants being under the age of 21. The

majority of participants were a1~o Caucasian/white (95%), and freshman or sophomore
status undergraduates (71 %}. All but one participant (who reported bisexual) reported
their sexual orientation as heterosexual.

A1aterials
The materials for study one included a simulated jury room, trial transcripts ,md
questionnaires. The trial transcripts contained all aspects of a court trial including

opening statements from judge, defense, ::md prosecution, direct and cross examination of
witnesses~ closing statements, and the judge's charge. The trial transcripts were based on
reported incidences of hate crim~ (Herek, Cogan & Gillis, 2002), Minnesota penal code
for assault in the firstdegree (Penal Code§ 609.221(1, 2)) and assault motivated by bias
(Penal Code § 609.2231( 4)), and similarly conducted tTial s~ttings (i.e., jury simulation
studies). The facts of the case were as follows: the alleged victim (Grear) and alleged
perpetrator (Smith) wtre in a Jocal bt·r (i.e., not a gay bar) and they began a conversation.
Grear bought Smith a drink. Grear then asked Smith to slow dance and Smith begun

beating Grear until he or she was unconscious. Throughout the trial the case was referred
to as either first-dc6ree assault or bias··motivated assault (hate crime) depending on the
condition. 'Nithin each condition the alleged victim and alleged p~rpetrator were of the
same gender (Appendix A).

Questionnaires

Prescrecn. This measure nssesscd each participanf s level of homophobia,
specifically support or non-support of non-heterosexual community members, using the
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Index of Homophobia (1HP~ Hudson & Rickdts, 1980). Participan•.s were asked to rate

the extent to which they agreed with statements such as: ''I would enjoy attending sociaI
functions at which gay men and/or ,esbians were present" and "I would foel
uncomfortable knowing that my son's male teacher was gay." Items were rated on a scale
of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Certain items were reverse coded and the

scale was scored for each participant. The possible range of scores for this scale was
from -A (non ·support) to 4 (support) v rith recent studies noting that amount of
homophobia as measured by this r.cale was influenced most by social .interactjon,

residence and religiosity, with scores vnrying as a function of these variables (Snively,
Kreuger, Stretch, .,vatt & Chadha, 200~; Span & Vidal, 2003). The range of participant

scores in this study were . .].69 to 3.07 (Af::= -0.22, SD-.::: 1.42). A mt.~dian (0) split ·was
used to categorize participants as either high or ]ow according to their level of support for
gay community members.

Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to i~dicate their age, sex,
· race, education level and sexual orientation.

Individual jurcr verdict. Participants were asked to indicate whether they support
a guilty or not-guilty decision in the case based on legal standards. The label of ''assault"
or "assault motivated by bias (hate crime)" was varied depending upon condition ..

Private belief rating scale. Participants were asked to indicate their private
beliefa (not bound by legal standards) concerning the guilt of the defendant on a scale

ranging from -5 (certain defendant should not be convicted) to +S(ccrtain defendant
shou.ld be convicted), to 'Nhich the participant believed the alleged prrpetrator should be
convicted (not bound by legal standards). This scale has been used in pr1:vious studies
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crnployingjmy simulation paradigms to assess beliefs not bound by legal standards
(KHsinn, i 1)9 I; 'krrnncc, 2000,L

Hate crime. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about w·~ether or ,1ot
the defendant committed a hate crime. Possible responses ranged from O (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

Victim blame. This scale consisted of seven items (Chronbach's a= 0.79) and
assessed the degree to which participants assigned blame to the victim. Possible
responses ranged from O (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). These items we;

summed and averaged to derive a contpositc score reflecting victim blame, and

i.1 ·

udcd

the following items: the victim is partly to blame for the action of the defendar,'. the
defendant's actions were reasonable, the victim should Ir.now to be more cac

· approaching someone whose sexual orientation is unknown, the defend[w 1
the result of unwanted advaJlccs by the vktim, the defendant was pr<Yvc.

d ubout

,ctions were
,, the

defendanf s actions \Vere justified, and the victim deserved it.

Personal decision. Participants were asked to list, as briefly

:is

t-,ossible, the

reasons for their personal decision in this case. This was an open-ended questiom1afre

limited only by the page length. Responses were cla;:;.t;;ified to include ail statements
made by participants regrnding their reas0ns for their decision in the case. Statements
were dual-wded if necessary. The classification scheme was derived .1fter reading aJi
statements and listing the type of argument presented. Responses were classified into six
categories including: legal arguments, physical evidence, morality statements, victimrelated statements, witness and/or perpetrator crcdi bi 1i;,

each category~ statements 1nade regarding the dccisioi
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ind extra- legal factors. Wiihin
,I' guilty or not gt1.ilty were nlso

clns:-:i fied. Statements were assessed independently by two scorers with n 3trong mf.crrnter reliability coefficient (r:::=:0.93). Discrepancies were discussed and~ decision to
classify each statementdualiy or individually was made (Appendix B).

Procedure
Participants were signed up over the phonC:; for a "jury time" by a research
assistant. Whea they arrived, they were seated in the jury room where the study was

explained to them and they read ancl sign an informed consent form (Appendix C). E8.ch ·
condition consisted of 27 to 30 participants and at ieast one member of the opposite.sex

was recrnited for each jury. They were each given a random juror number and were
asked to fill out a demographic questiom1aire. After filling out the questionnaire, they

1vvere given one of four trial transcripts (depending upon condition) and asked to read
through itcarefuUy. The transcript was then recollected when foey were finished reading
it and they were asked to fill out questionna·ires assessing their verdict in tl1e case .~ weH
as their perceptions of the perpetrator and defendant. After filling out all questionnaires,
participants were then debriefed and compensated for their time.

Results

Individual Ju, or Verdict
A Pearson Chi Square analysis was conducted to evaluate the effects of label and
gender of victim on ratings of guilt. Results failed to yield significance for label,

x2

=0.05, ns (guilty votes: assault: n = 41; hate crime: n = 45), or for victim gende!',

x2

=0.19, ns (guilty votes: male: n = 42; fomale: n= 44).
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Private Belief Rating /Scale

A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) x 2 (victim gender) analysis of variance
(1\.NOVA) was ccmducted on paiticiprmts' private belief ratings. Results failed to yield
sjgni ficance for either labei, F'(l, 110)=2.07, ns, victim gender, F<I, or their interaction~
F<l .. In order to ass 1~ss the extent to which participants believed the defenda.T1t should.be
convicted overall, participant responses were tested against the rr:idpoint of the scale (0).

Whe!1tested against the midpoint of the scale, there was a significant .~ffect, ·
t(l l 3)=11.20, p<.O 1, such that participants overwhelmingly believed that the defenda11t
should be convicted (M=2.52, SD=2.40).

Hate Crime

A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) x 2 (victim gender) ANOV A was conducted on

participants' ratings of their belief that the defendant had committed a hate crime.
Results failed to yield significance for either !2bel, F(l, 110)=2 .57, ns, victim gender,
F<l, nr their interaction, F<l.. In orderto assess the extent to which participants
believed the defe~dant committed a hate crime ove-rall, participai~tresponses were tested
against the midpoint of the scale (3). When tested against the midpoint of the scale, there
was a significant effect, t (113)

= 6.09,p< .01, such that participants stated that tr.~y

believed the defendant did commit a hate crime (lvi=3.99, SD=l.74).
Victim Blame
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) x 2 (vic6m gender) x 2 (support for gay
community members: high vs. low) ANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of
victim blame. Results failed to yield significance for either label, F<I, or victim g~nder,
F<l. Results did indicate a significam difference for support for gay community
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n1embers, F(L: 106)=11.73,p<.01~ suc.;h that those who showed low support for gay
communi.ty mcrnbcrs \Vere more likely to blame the vietim (A,f=2.40, SD=0.97) than those

who showed high support for gay community members (M==1JL. ST.x:-:-=0.72). The
interactions between label and victim gender, F(l, 106)=2.83, ns, label and suppor., F<l 1
victim gender and support, F<l, or label, victim gender and ~upport., F<l, were not

significant.
Personal Decision
A content analysis was conducte<l using open-ended participant responses. Each
participant made at least one statement with most making more than one. Each statement

was classified with the possibility that it coul.J b0 dualwcoJe<l for a total of .. 10
statements. Responses were classified into six categories (legal arguments, physical
evidence, morality statements~ victim-related statements, witness and/or perpetrator
credibility, and extra-legal factors} as well as guilty or not guilty within each category
(Appendix D). A frequency distribution indicated that participant responses often

included statements regarding physical evidence (n=81 ). The next category into which

statements fell most often was morality statements (n=67) with extra~legal factors being
lowest (n:-=29). Others included legal arguments (n=4 7), victim-related statements
(n=31), and witness and/or perpetrator credibility (n=55). More often than not,
participants made statements regarding the guilt of the defendant (n=226) rather than
perception that the defendant was not guilty (n=84; Table 1).
Discussion

Although no differences were found between the differe11tial labels of the crime
and gender of the victim, re.~uhs do point to the fact thDt most pmiicipants regardless of

.

.

.

condition~ voted guilty, believed that the defendant should be convicted of the crime. and

felt the defendant committed a hate crime. Given the relatively equal verdicts for assa.u!t ·
and hate crime, it may be the case that the nature of the crime (i.e., assault committed

against a member of minority sexual odentadon) was too Dmbiguous ar.d therefore was
perceived as fitting both crime labels (i.e., first degree assault and bias-motivated assault)

equally~ Further, it may be the case that ibis situation is seen as very typical of both a
hate crime as well as first degree assault and jurors responded to it as such.
Since both the victim and defendant were of the same gender, gender ::;tereotypes

may have been less salient in that they may have been viewed

a4>

being of equal size and

strength. ffit had been the case of a male assaulting a femal~ or vice versa, gender
stereotypes may have been more readily C[l.lled upon by jurors to help them. make their
decision (i.e., differential size and strength may have been key factors in attributing
blame). If this had been the case, differences corresponding to the gender of the victim
based on these stereotypes may have been evidenced.
In terms of the results regarding victim blame, it appears that although the crime
label and gender of the victim had no effect, sorne bias was apparent in attributing blarne
to the victim. Using the prescreen questionnaire to group participants into high or low
support for gay community member (i.e., level of heterosexism), it appears that those
who have high support for gay community members (or less heterosexism) a:re less likely
to employ victim blaming in this case. Although p:::rticipants in all conditions agreed that
the defendant should be r,onvicted and that the d0fcndant committed a hate crime, there
was a difference as to how much blame they attributed to the victim in tl,e assault
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scenario. This difference was not due to the label of the crime or to the gender of the
victim but rather to previously held attitudes of support for gay community membe:s.
Those that previously rated their support for gay community members as high
, vere less likely to blame the victim than those that rated their support us low. Given that
this case involved gay or lesbian corr·-i.unity members, and previous studies have found
negative attitudes about lesbians and gay men to be prominently held by heterosexual
men and women (Kite & Whitley~ 1994; Yang, 1997), h is arguable that previously held
attitudes on the pmis of the jurors may have played a bigger role in how they attributed

blame in this case than the dispositional characteristics of the victim or the situation of
the given event at hand.
It may be the case that regardless of whether or not the defendant should be
convicted or commitied a hate crime, some jurors may still be placing some of the blame
on the victim. Implications of this are as far reaching as in the sentence doled out to a
convicted hate crime perpetrator. This was evident in samples of the personal decision
statements participants made. Statements such as "The victim wouldn't take no for an

answer," and "The victim pushed it" both indicate some amount of blame directed toward

the victim as though the assault would not have occurred had the victim not "provoked"
it.

Althotigh the main hypotheses of the current study were not supported, the

information gleaned from the results may illuminate factors that need to be further
explored in future studies. Prominent areas to be taken into consideration in future

studies include the investigation of how prevjous attitL1des may play a role in juror
decision-·making in cases involving hate crime, the exploration of hate crime using a non-
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typical setting or situation. und cxtru-Jegalfactors that mtly play a role in juror de.cisionmaking- and attributions of blame. The next two studies will exp.lore the3c last two areas
.

.

· by looking at a hate crime scenario based on gender rather than sexual orie1it.2tion (Study

. 2) and investigating two extra-legal factors that may play a role in a typical hate ~rime
scenario (Study 3).
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY TWO

Purpose
The previous study focused on hate crime based on heterosexism using a scenarjo
that portrayed the typical idea of what a hate crime consists of (i.e., perpetrated against
minority sexual orientation, involves violence, committed by young person). In an ~ffort

to further explore perceptions of hate crime, also of interest is u case in which the
scenario does not fit the notion of a typical hate crime. One context in particular where
this could be examined includes cases involving hate crime based on gender.
Hate crimes based on gender are currently included in the hate crime laws of
some states (including MN). However, the inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes is a
topic of much debate as many of these crimes may fall under domestic violence statutes.

Crimes against women are more often than not committed by a male domestic partner
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2000). Although domestic situations fall under domestic
violence statutes, the fact that they are crimes based on gender (i.e., crimes against
women) may also categorize them under hate crime statutes as well. Following the hate
crime sentencing enhancement act (1993) many states have increased penalties for bim,motivr1ted crimes that may serve as harsher punishment. than their domestic violence
statutes. Although si.atutes for domestic violence tmd hate crimes differ from state to
state, each perpetrator can only be charged under one statute for each crime. Opponents
of including gender or sex as a category of hate crime may argue that a way to convict
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cri.minals who commit these types of crime already exists. Problems with

ilih

argument

however, are that not every crime motivated by sex or gender stems frorr. a domestic

situation,nor is every gender-based crhne committed against women.
Crimes against men committed hy women also exist and are very often ignored

due to lack of reporting stemming from public ridicule of battered men (Steinmetz &
Lucca, 1988). A man being assaulted by a girlfriend or wife may be evaluated negatively
because he is perceived as violating gender-·based stereotypes that place men within
positions of power (Brovennan, Vogel~ Braverman, C1arkson & Rosencrantz, 1972).

Although gender or sex as a category of bias-m.otivatjon in hate crime is meant largely to
protect crimes against women, it may also serve to highlight the often overlooked crime
of intimate violence perpetrated against men by women. Given the historical ridicule of

a

battered men, it may be easier for a man to report a crime based on the bias of woman
rather than a domestic dispute. Jn order to assess possible differential attributions for
blame in cases involving a hate crime falling under the category of sex or gender, the ·
crime in this study was presented as an opposite-gender assault.

Study tvvo also sought to investigate the impact of labeling a crime on juror
decision-making and attributions of the crime. As the scenario in this study did not fit the
typical notion of a hate crime, it was hypothesized that jurors in this study would find the
defendant guilty more often when the crime is labeled as assault than when it is labeled as
bias-motivated (hate crime). Also, based ongender stereotypes, it was hypothesized that
more blarne will be attributed to the male victim than to the female victim.
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Method
Participants

Participc1nts (N=98) were recmited via follow-up phone calls after having filled

outa contact questionnaire in an undergraduate psychology course. Participants were
asked to play the part of mock-jurors in a study on perceptions of crime. They were
randomly assigned tc one of four conditions stemming from a 2 (Iabe]: assault vs. hate

crime) x 2 (vic.1

:1

sex: male victim vs. female v.ictim) factorial design. In this study the

victim and perpetrator were always of opposite gender.
Of the r~i1 licipants in this sample, 58 of them were women. The ages of

participants rangeJ from 18-42 with a majority (86%) under the age of 21. A majority of
participants

in this study were also Caucasian/white {93%) and freshman or sophomore

status undergraduaL:~s (86%). All participants except one (who reported bisexual)
reported their sexm:il orientation as heterosexual .

Materials

T11e material~ required for study two included a simulated jury room, trial
transcripts and questi< rmaires. The trial transcripts contained all aspects of a ·~ourt trial
including openlng statements from judge, defense, and prosecution, direct and cross
examination of witnesses, closing statements, and the judge's charge. The trial
transcripts were based on reported incidences of hate crime (Herek, Cogan & Gillis,
2002), Minnesota pen:1' ·ode for assault in the first degree (Penal Code§ 609.221(1, 2)) .
and assault motivated by : ,\as (Penal Code§ 609.2231 (4)), and similarly conducted trial
settings (i.e., jury simulmion studies). The facts of the case were as follows: the alleged
victim (Grear) and alleged perpetrator (Smith) were in a local bar and they began
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conversation. Orear bought Srnitha drink. Ot'ear then ar.:ked Smith to slow dance and

i

Smith began beating Grear until he or sh~ was unconscious. Throughout the trial the case
was refene<l to as either first-degree assault or bias-motivated assault (hate crime)
depending on the condition. Within conditions the alleged victim and alleged perpetrator
were of opposite gender (Appendix E).
Questionnaires
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate their age, sex,
race, education level and sexual orientation.

Individual juror verdict. Participants were asked to indicate whether they support
a guilty or not-guilty decision in the case based on legal standards. The label of "assault."

or "ar;sault motivated by bias (hate crime)" was varied depending upon condition.
Privatz be!iefrating scale .. Participants were asked to indicate their private

beliefs (not bound by legal standards) concerning the guilt of the defendant on a scale
ranging from -5 (certain defendant should not be convtcted) to +5( ce1tain defendant

should be convicted), to which the participant believed the alleged perpetrator shm1ld be
convicted (not bound by legal standards). This scale has been used in previous studies

employing jury simulation paradigms to assess beliefs not bound by legal standards
(Kasian, 1991; Terrance, 2000).
Victim is mentally unstable. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about

whether or not the victim was mentally unstable. Possible responses ranged from 0
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
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Hate crime. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about whether or not
the defendant committed a hate crime. Possible responses ranged from O (strongly

disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
Reasonable. Pruiicipants were asked to indicate their belief that a reasonable
person would have acted the same as the defendant. Possible responses ranged from 0
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

Victim blame. This scale consisted of seven items (Chronbach's a= 0.82) and
· assessed the degree to which participants assigned blmr~e to the victim. Possible

responses ranged from O (strongly disagree) to 6(strongly agree). These items were
summed and averaged to derive a composite score reflecting victim blame, and included
the following items: the victim is partly to blame for the action of the defendant, the
defendant's actions were reasonable, the victim should know to be more careful about
approaching someone whose sexual orientation is unknown,.the defendant's actions were
the result of unwanted advances by the victim, the defendant was provoked, the
defendant's actions were justified, and the victim deserved it.

Personal decision. Participants were asked to list, as briefly as possible, the
reasons for their personal decision in this case. This was an open-ended questionnaire
limited only by the page Jength. Responses were classified to include all statements
made by participants regarding their reasons for their decision in the case. Statements ,
were dual-coded if necessary. The classification scheme wa~ derived after reading all
statements and listing the type of argwnent presented. Responses were classified into six

categories including: legal arguments, physical evidence, morality statements, victim.related statements, witness and/or perpetrator credibility, and extra-legal factors. Within
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each category, statements made regarding thu decisions of guilty or not guilty were also
classified. Statements were assessed independe11tly by two iscorers with a strong interrater reliability coefficient (r=0.91). Discrepancies were discussed and a decision to

classify each statement dually or individually ,vas made (Appendix F).
Procedure
Participants w~re signed up over the phone for a "jury time" by a research
assistant. When they arrived, they were seated in. the jury room where the study was
explained to them and they read and signed an informed consent fonn (Appendix C).

Each condition consisted of 23 to 29 participants and at least one member of the opposite
sex was recruited foreachjury. They were each given a random juror number and were
asked to fill out a demographic questionnaire. After filling out the questionnaire, they
were given one of four trial transcripts (depending upon condition) and asked to read
through it carefully. The transcript was then recollected when they were finished reading
it and they were asked to fill out questionnaires assessing their verdict in the case as well .
as their perceptions of the perpetrator and defendant. After filling out all questionnaires,
participants were then debriefed and compensated for their time.
Results

Individual Juror Verdict
A Pearson Chi Square analysis was conducted assessing difference in label (hate
crime vs. assauit) and victim gender for verdict of guilty or not guilty. Results indicated
a significant effect for label,

i =9.96, p<.O 1) such that those in the assault condition (n =

34) were more likely than those in the hate crime condition (n =22) to find the defendant
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guilty. No signitfoant difference was found for victim gender,

i ~o.85, ns (male: n = 27;

female: n = 29).

Private BeliefRating Scale
A 2 (label: hate clime vs. assault) X 2 (victim gender) ANOVA was conducted on
participants' private bielief ratings. Results failed to yield a significant effect for either
label, F<l, victim gender, .F'<l, ortheir interaction, F(l, 94)=1.7 l, ns. In order 10 asse~m
the extent to which partici"""·ants believed the defendant shonfr] bl": convictd. overall~

participant responses were tested against the midpoint of the s.caic (0). When tc£ted
against the midpoint of the scale, there was a si.gnificant effect, !(97)~11.62,p<.Ol, such
that participants stated that the defendant should be convicted (M=-/1.79~, SD=2.37).

Victim is Mentally Unstable
A2 (label: hate crime vs. assault} X2 (victim gender) ANOV A was conducted on
participants' ratings of the victim as men.tally unstable. Results indicated a significant
main effect for label, F(l, 94)=4.48, p<.05, such that participants in the assault condition
(M=L83, SD=l.29) rated the victim as more mentally unstable than those in the hate

crime condition (M=l .29, SD=l .39). No significant effect. was foun1 for victim gender,
F(l, 94)=3.63, ns, or their interaction, F<1.

·Hate Crime
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) X 2 (victim gender) ANOVA was conducted on

participants' ratings of their belief that the defendant had committed a hate crime.
Results failed to yield a significant effect for either label, F(l, 94)=2.32, ns, or victim

gender, F<l. . Jn order to assess the extent to which participants believed the defendant
committed a hate crime overaB, partidpant responses were tested against the midpoint of

38

the scale (3): When tested '71.gainst the midpoint ofthe scale, there

effect, t(97)

=:-=

Wa';

a significant

-3. 73, p<.01, such that p'lliicipants beHeved that the defendant did not

commit a hate crime (M=2.28, SD=l .93).

Reasonable
A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault} X 2 (victim gender) ANOVA was conducted on
participants' ratings of the defendant as reasonable. Results indicated a significant main

effect for label, F(l, 94)=5.67,p<.05, such that participants in the assault condition

(M=0.70, SD=0.92) vvere more likely to see the defendant a~ reasonable than those in the

hate crime condition (M==0.35, S/J:=0.62). This main effect was qualified by it;
interaction with victim gender, F(l, 94)=7.95,p<.01. Simple effect analysis oflabe! at

each level of gender indicated a significant effect only for the male victim (or female

perpetrator), F(l, 97)=7.93,p<.01. Participants reading the transcript depicting the
victim as male and perpetrator as female were more likely to rate the perpetrator as

reasonable in the assault condition (M=l .04, SD=0.98) than in the hate crime condition
(M=0.26, SD=0.45). Results failed to yield significance for the female victim (mak: .

perpetrator), F<l (hate crime label: M=0.41, SD=0.73; assault label: M=0.35, SD=0.71).
See Figure 1.
Vlctim Blame

A 2 (label: hate crime vs. assault) X 2 (victim g~nder) ANOVA was conducted on
participants' ratings of victim blame. Results failed to yield a significant effect for either
label, F(], 94)=3.38, ns, victim gender,

FO, 94)=0.42, ns,

i

I

39

or their interaction, F<L

Personal Decision
A content nnalysis was conducted using open-ended participant'responscs. Each
participant made at least one statem~nt with most making more than one. Each statewent

was classified with the possibility that it could be dual-coded for a totr_i of 276
statements. Responses were classified into six categories (legal arguments, physical

evidence, morality statements, victim-related statements, witness andior perpetrator
credibility, and extra-legal factors) as well as guilty or not guilty within each category
(Appendix G). Afrequency distribution indicated that participant responses often

included stutemmts regarding physical evidence '~tr=66). The next category into which
statements fell most often was morality statements (n=62) with ex1.m-lega1 factors being

lowest (n=l 7). Others included legal arguments (n=57), victim-related statements
(n=23), and witness and/or perpetrator crf)dibility (n=5 l). More often than not
participants madt: statements regarding the guilt of the defendant (n=l 77) rather than .
perception that the defendant ,vas not guilty (n=99; Table 2).
Discuss1on
This study explo1 ed differential crime classification and gender of the victim in a
non-typical hate crime :;r ~nario. The current study indicated differences for the labeling

of the crime. Participant~ in the assault condition were more likely than those in the hate
crime condition to find the defendant guilty. This is not surprising given that the scenario
used in this study was a non-typical scenario for hate crime (i.e., committed because of
the gender of the victim). Mock-jur~rs believed the defendant to be guilty of assault, but

.the scenario was not seen as a hate crime and therefore when only given that option (i.e.,
gu1lty of bias-motivated assault or not guilty), jurors were finding the defendant not
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guilty. This finding is in contrast to what was found i,1 stu<ly 1. Jurors jn that study were

overwhe]mingly finding the defendant guilty Vlith no differences due to whether or not
the crime was labeled as bias-motivated or first degree assault. The differences between
these two scenarios were twofold.
The first difference was that the study 1 portrayed a scenari0 thought to be very
typical of a hate crime vvhereas the second study did not. This discrepancy may have
been sufficient enough for participants to vote differentially on whether or not the
· defendant was guilty. The second difference involves the gender of the alleged victim

and alleged perpetrator. ln the first stuuy both parties involved were consistently th~
same genders~ in the second stud" they were consistently the opposite. Although
differences in voting for guilty or not guilty were not shown via the gender of the victim,
the situation of having them be same and opposite genders may have altered the way the.y

were voting or their attributions ofblame.
Participants in the assault condition rated the victimas more mentally unstable
than those in the hate crime <.:cndition. Although again, there was no difference here for
the gender of the victim, it would appear that labeling the crime as hate may be giving

some legitimacy to the victim in cases of opposite-gender assault (i.e., the victim is not
mentally unstable, the perpetrator holds bias). It may be the case that the label is

providing a. facilitative cause (Kelley, 1972) to the jmors and therefore they are giving
more weight to the idea that in a bias-motivated assault, the bias of the perpetrator is what
is promoting the assault and not the actions of the victim~ Perhaps having some idea of

why the attack occurred may have served to lessen victim blaming on the part of the
jurors. In this study, not having that label, that built-in reason why, lerljurors to rote the
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victim as mentally unstable more so than when they were impUcitly given that reason
(i.e., it was labeled a hate crime).
Additionally, participants in the assault condition also found the defendant guilty
more often than those in the hate crime condition. At first glance it would seem that the
hate crime label would serve to legitimize the victim and. in turn lead to greater
conviction for the perpetrator. However in this case, it would seem that the view of the
victim as ment1.lly unstable (greater within the assault condition) coincides with

increased conviction rates for the defendant. It may be the case that jurors' perception of

the victim as mentally unstable was not relevant enough to attribute blame to the victim.
Likewise, the perception of the victim as mentally stable may not have been relevant
enough to overshadow the fa.ct that this case did not fit the typical notion of a hate crime.
Participants reading the transcript depicting the female perpetrator committing
assault on a m~ le victim rated her as significantly more reasonable ( although ratings were
still in the "disagree" region of the scale) when the assault was labe]ed as first degree
assault rather than when it wa~ labeled as a bias-motivated assault (hate crime). That fa,

jurors had a more difficult time seeing an attack on a male by a female as a hate criwe
(i.e., she would be Jess reasonable in this scenario). Conversely, in the condition where a
female victim was assault~d by a male perpetrator, the opposite rating was given (i.~.,
male perpetrator was rated more reasonable when labeled as hate crime than assault;
although the difference did not reach significance). It appears that jurors .haci an easier
time seeing the attack on a female by a male

~

a hate crime. It is arguable, based on the

availability heuristic (i.e., it is much easier to think of instances when.~ a man assaults a
woman than vice versa), that misogyny is much more apparent in our culture than
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misandry and jurors may have had a difficult time seeing a female to male attack as due
to hatred.
The differences in study 2 may have had to do with the fact that the crime
committed was an opposite-gender attack. Gender-based stereotypes support
expectations regarding "appropriate~' behavior for men and women (Hilton & von Hipple,

1990). For example, women are stereotypicaUy viewed as passive while me'n are seen as
aggressive (Corely & Pollack, l ~96). Stereotypes delineating the roles of men and
women are reflected within characteristics typically ascribed to domestic violence victims

and offenders. Although this is not a case of domestic violence, the pairing between a
man and woman in an assault scenario may hold some of the same expected descriptions

of what roles men and women should play. Within the context of heterosexual domestic
violence, women are perceived as the "legitimateH recipients of abuse, whereas men are
seen as the perpetrators (Terrance, 2000). This assumption implies that it is more
reasonable for a man to hold bias against a \Voman that may result in assault than it is for
a woman to do the same for a man. Simply put, it is easier, given these delineated roles,

to identify with the concept of misogyny than misandry;

Although study 2 pinpointed some of the ways gender-role stereotypes may come
into play for opposite-gender assault, no differences were found in study 1 with the
portrayal of same-gender assault. This may be due to the fact that study 1 involved
violence against a non-heterosexual person and this same-gender pairing may be why no
differ_enceswere shown. In an opposite-gender assault, gender is evident, along with
gender-role expectations including the belief that men are stronger and more aggressive

than women. In a same-gender assault, the perpetrator and victim. may have been viewed
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as ha.ving the possibility 0f being mutually combative (i.e., two men are of the same
stt·ength and two women are of the same strength). In fact, many participants made
personal decision 8taternents in accord with these stereotypes. Statements were made
about the female perpetrator having to defend herself. No such statemen.~s were made
when the perpetrator was depicted as male. It may be the case that when there is no
apparent reason (i.e., hatred of men is not as apparent in our culture as hatred of women)

for the attack that jurors postulate circumstances that were not provided to them in order
to substantiate reasons the ati:ack may have occurred (e.g., "She must have felt threatened

to a certain extent" and "I think she had some ulterior motive for continuing to beat him
while on the ground that goes beyond his sexual actions");
Society constructs gender in oppositional tenns: what men are, women are not,
and vice versa (Renzetti; 1999). It is·women's "'nature" to be passive and dependent,

wllHe men are described most often as assertive (Hegstrom & McCarl-Nielsen, 2002). If
this is the case, why would a woman committing assault against a man. have been rated as
more reasonable? If gender-role stereotypes are what is at work here, this seems
incongruent with the previous finding.

It is this incongruence that may explain why the

femal~ in this scenario is seen as more reasonable than the male. In searching for t!1e
expected gender-role behavior, jurors were lefl empty-handed reading an assault scenario
where a woman attacks a man simply by virtue of his gender. The inability to find an
apparent explanation led many participants to assume that there was something else going
on. This scenario was often viewed as a self-defense scenario even though the attack was
not "provoked" by the man. This type of explanation was evidenced in personal decision
statements such as, "She folt uneasy and fighting him off was tl1e only way she felt safe"
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and "She must have felt, threatened to a certain extent." In this way then (i.e., selfdefense of a woman against a man), the assault is seen as reasonable but not due to hatred

of rncn.
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CHAPTER V
STUDY THREE
Purpose

The two previous studies focused on the impact of labeling a crime as hate, the
type of crime that was committed (i.e., motivated by sexual orientation or gender) as well

ns the gender of the victim and perpetrator. In addition to these impacts within Jegal
cases, extra-legal factors such as location and situation also play a role in how jurors
make decisions about a crime in a courtroom (Clark, 2000). Studies have looked at som,;!
of these factors as they play a role in perceptions of bias-motivated crime based on
racism (i.e., gender and race of the perpetrator and victim; Craig & Waldo, 1996;
Marc.us-Newhall, Blake & Baumann, 2002). However no research has examined extralegal factors in a case involving bias~motivated crime based on heterosexism. As these
factors tend to play a pivotal role in perceptions of other types of hate crime, it was
expected that they too will play a role in heterosexist motivated crime.
This study examined two possible extra-legal factors that may play a role in
jurors' decision-making. First, the location of 'i.he crime was systematically varied. In
this study, a similar trial scenario as in study one was presented depicting a case in which

a bias motivated assault to'-;~ place (labeled ns a hate crime) between two men. The
location of the events of the right in question was varied with the attack taking place in a

local bar (i.e., not a gay bar) or in a gay bar. Approaching someone of the same gender ,
and asking them to dance may be seen as more justifiable in a setting such as a gay bar
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where .it might be expected. Jurors may therefore attribute more blame to the perpetrator
in that setting simp]y because of its unexpectedness or distinctiveness (Kelley, 1972).
Second, "provocation" was varied. In the "provocation" present condition, the trial
transcript was changed to convey that after the heterosexual man accepted a drink from
the gay man, the victim proceeded to then ask the perpetrator to dance as he put hls arm
around him before being hit by the perpetrator. In the "provocation'' absent condition,
the transcript was changed to read that after the non-gay man accepted a drink from the

gay man, the victim attempted to walk away before being hit by the perp~trator (i.e., he
does not tocch him or ask him to dance). Kelley (1972) argued that people will give
more weight to a facilitative cause (something that promotes that particular event) than to
an inhibitory cause (something that would weaken or undermine that particular event).
"Provocation" on the part of the victim may very well be viewed in this case as a

facilitative cause. As "provocation" may increase victim blamingon the part ofmock

jurors, it was expected that in the "provocation" present condition, jurors will attribute
more blame to the victim.
Method

Participants
Participants (N:--=77) were recruited via an announcement made in their
undergraduate psychology course. Participants were asked to play the part of mockjurors in a study on perceptions of crime. Jurors were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions stemming from a 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation'~: present

vs. absent) factorial design.
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Of the pruticipants in this sample, 40 of them were women. Participants' ages
ranged from 18~30 with a majority (86%) of them being under the age of 21. A majority

of participants in this sample were Caucasian/white. (87% ), of freshman or sophomore
undergraduate status (88% )) and all participants reported their sexual. orientation as
heterosexual.

Materials
Materials for study three included the same transcript (hate crime labeled, same ·

sex male conditions) as in study one with the exception of location and 4'provocation".

Pe,·~~·.:ipants rend a trial transcript that stated that the assault took place in a local bar (i.e.,
not a gay bar) or altematively that the assault took place in a gay bar. \Vithin location
conditions, participants read a trial transcript that depicted "provocation" on the part of
the victim or no "provocation" on the part of the victim (Appendix H).

Questionnaires
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate their age, sex,
race, education level and sexual orientation.

Individual juror verdict. Participtmts were asked to indicate whether they support
a guilty or not·guilty decision in the case ba5ed on legal standards. The label of "assaulf'
or "assault motivated by bias (hate clime)" was varied depending upon condition.

Private belief rating scale. Participants were asked to indicate their private
beliefs (not bound by legal standards) concerning the guilt of the defendant on a scale
ranging from -5 (certain defendant should not be convi~ted) to +5(certain defendant
should be convicted), to which the participant believed the alleged perpetrator should he
convicted (not bound by legal standards). This scale has been used in previous studies
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employing jury simulation paradigms to as:;ess beliefs not bound hy fegaJ standards
(Kasinn, 1991; TerraMe~ 2000);

Hate crime. Participants were asked to indicate their belief about whether or not
the defendant committed a hate crime. Possible responses ranged from O (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

Defendant solely to blame. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which

they believed the defendant was solely to blame. Possible responses ranged from 0
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

Victim blame. This scale consisted of seven items (Chronbach's a= 0.88) and
assessed the degree to which participants assigned blame to the victim. Possible

rer;ponses ranged from O (stTOngly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). These items were

summed and averaged to derive a composite score reflecting victim blame, and included
the followir.g items: the victim is partly to blame for the action of the defendant, the
defendant'~ actfons were reasonable, the victim should know to be more careful about .
approaching someone whose s~xual orientation·is unknown, the defendant's actions were
the result of unwanted advances by the victim, the defendant was provoked, the

defendant's actions were justified, and the victim deserved it.

Personal decision. Participants were asked to list, as briefly as possibie, the
reasons for their persor.~al decision in this case. This was an open-ended questionnaire
limitert only by the page length. Responses were classified to include all statements

made by participants regarding their reasons for their decision in the cac;e. Statement,
were dual .. coded if necessary. The classification scheme was derived after reading all

statements and listing the type of argt!rnent presented. Responses were classified into six
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categories including: h;)gal arguments, physical evidence, rnoraHty statements, victimrelated statements, witness and/or perpetrator credibility, and extra-legal factors. Within
each category, statements made regarding the decisions of guilty or not guilty were also
classified. Statements were a5sesscd independently by two scorers with a strong interrater reliability coefficient (r=0.93). Discrepancies were discussed a.11d a decision to
classify each statement dually or individually was made (Appendix I). ·

Procedure
Participants we.re asked to participate at the end of class time in their psychology

course. The study was explained to them by a research assistant and they rearl and signed
an infonned consent form (Appendix C). Each condition consisted of 18 to 23
participants and at least one member of the opposite sex was recruited for each jury.
They were each given a random juror number and were asked to fill out a demographic
questionnaire. After filling out the questionnaire, they were given one of four trial
transcripts (depending upon condition) and asked to read through it carefully. The
transcri;,t was then recollected when they were finished reading it and they were asked to
fill out questionnaires assessing their verdict in the case as well as their perceptioAi:; 0f the
perpetrator and defendant. After filling out all questionnaires, participants were then
debriefed aiid compensated for their time.

Results

Individual Juror Verdict
A Pearson Chi Square was conducted assessing the difference in verdict (i.e.,

guilty vs. not guilty) for location and "provocation.'' Results indicated no significant

50

difference for location,

i' =0.41, ns (guilty votes: gay bar: n ~~ 29; Jocal bar: n =23), or

for "provocation," x2 ~0.11, ns (guilty votes: present.: n:::: 25; absent: n =27).
Private Belief Rating Scale
A 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 C'provocation"; r,~esent vs. absent)
ANOVA was conducted on participants' private belief ratings. Results failed to yield
significance for either location, F(l, 73)=2.13, ns, "provocation," F<l, or their
interaction, F(I, 73)=1.67, ns. In order to assess the extent to which participants believed
the defendant should be convicted overall~·participant responses w~re tested against the

midpoint of the scale (0). When tested against the midpo"int of the scale, there was n
significant effect, 1(76)=7. 96, p<.O i, such that pan~cipants believed the defendant shout·
be convicted (M=2.25, SD=2.48).

Hate Crime
A 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation'': present vs. absent)
ANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of their belief that the defendant had
committed a hate crime. Results fai1ed to yield significance for either location, F(l,
67)=1.61, ns, "provocation," F<I, or their 1.nTeradion, F<l. In order to assess the extent
to which participants believed the defendant committed a hate crime overall, participant
responses were tested againstthe midpoint of the scale (3). When tested against the
midpoint of the scale) results failed to yield significance, t (70)

= 1.55, ns, such that

participants did not agree nor disagree with the belief that the defendant corr.mitted a hate

crime (}Y/=3.37, SD=l.99).
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1

D4em/ant 50/ely to Blam2

· A 2 (location: local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation''; present vs, abs~nt)
ANO VA \Va8 ct,nducted 011 participants' beli.cf that the defendant was solely to blame~

Results indicated a significant difference for location, F( 1, 67)=8. 70, p<.O 1, such that
those in the gay bar conditiO'nwere more likely to state that the defendant was solely to
blam~ (M-=4.24, SD=l .48) than those in the local bar condition (kl~3.20, SD=l. 75). No

significant effect was found for "provocation," F(l, 67)=2.10) ns, or their inte.raction,

F(l, 67)=2.59, ns.

Victim l3lame
A 2 (location~ local bar vs. gay bar) x 2 ("provocation": present vs. (ibsent)
ANOVA was conducted on participants' ratings of victim blame. Results indicated a,

significant main ~ffect for location, F(l! 67)=5.J8, p<.05, such that participants in the
local bar condition (1W=2.39, S.D=l .29) were more likely to place blame on the victim

than those in the gay bar condition (M= 1.83, SD=l .02). There was aiso a signiffoant
main effect for "provocation," .F(], 67)=6.16,p<.05, such that thc,se in the "provocation"

present conditkm (.M=2.40, SD=l .20) were more likely to pJace blar.ie on the victim t1rn.n
those in the '·'provocR.tion" absent condition (M=UW, S.D=l.09). The interaction between
the two was not significant, F'(l, 67)=2.18, r:s.

Personal Decision
A contt nt analysis was conducted using open~ended pa.nicipant responses. Ea~h
participant made at least one statement whh mcst making more than one. Ea~h statement

was classified with the possibility thal it could b~ dual-coded for a total of 211
statement~. Responses were classified into six categoric~ (legal arguments, physical
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evidence. morality statements, viclim-re~ated statements, wit111.~-ss and/or perpetrator
credibility~ and extra.. legal factors) as well as guilty or not guilty within each ,~ategory
(Appe!ldix .J). A frequency distribution indicated that participant responses often

included statements regarding physical evidence (n=58). The next categorf into which
statements fo]l most often was witness r.nd/o" perpetrator credibility (n=48) with extralegal factors being lowest (n=20). Others included legal arguments (n=28), morality
statements (n=34), and victim-related. sfa.tements (n=23), More often than not

partidpants made statements regarding the guilt of the defendant (n=l 48) rather tha..11
perception that the defondant was not r,uilty (n=63; Table 3).
Discussion

Participants in this study believed the defendant should bt! convicted regardless of
condition. Similar to Study 1, the scenario used appeared to ]end itself to decisions of
buiJty on the part of the juron; ~n boti1 locations as well as whether or no{ the attack

wru;

"pr~,voked" by the victim. However, the area in which extra-legal factors appear t9 have
a more substantial role in jurors' attributions of-victim blame.

Specifically, those in the gay bar condition were more likely to ~tate t..1-iat the
defendant was solely to biame than those in the local bar condition. It may be th~ case

that jurors rated the defendant solely to blame in the gay bar more so than in the local bar
because the scenario depicted (i.e.~ the alleged victim offers to buy the alleged perpetrator

a drink) would be expected in that siturition. Furthermore, they may have viev.'ect, the
sc0nario in such a way that the alleged perpetrator was placing himself in that situation
therefore he bore more responsibility for his own behavior.

53

This is consistent with Kelley's (1972) suggestion that c:msistency, distinctiveness
and othtr's experiences Df un e:vent help shape attributions for the event SpecificaJly,
jurors appeared to alter their attributions based on what they thought the defendant shou]d

have ~xpected (i.e., if he was in a gay bar he should have expected to be hit on by men).
Attribution of respc.nsibility depends on the ability to identify the particular person who
caused the event, the belief that the person should have been able to foresee the o,.itcome,

the perception that the person's actions were not justified by the situation, and the belief
that the person a.cted out of free choice (McGraw, 1987b). P~acing soJ.e responsibility for
the outcome on the defendant in a , -iminal case also attributes olame to him m her for the
outcome by virtue of th~ setting (i.e., having been charged with a crime).
Likewise, participants in the local bar condition were more likely to place blame or.i
the victim than those in the gay bar comEtion. Being in a local bar (i.!!., not a gay bar)
and having someone oft.he same sex offer to buy you a drink is a situation that is much
more unexpected because of the location. In this situation then, the victim tends to be
blamed more so for the actions of the perpetrator than he would have been had the event
taken place in a gay bar.
Finally, those in the "provocation" present cc.ndition were more likely to place blame
on the victim than those in the ''provocation" absent condition. Again, some of the blame
tends to be p]aced upon the victim if he is doing something that is unexpected or
unaccepted by the jurors. Regardless of location, when the victim puts his arm arom1d
the perpetrator and asks him to dance, he becomes much more responsible for hb own
assault than had he simply asked tv buy the perpetrator a drink. If a juror is unable tu
pinpoint certain aspects of the defendant's behavior (i.e., explain the reasons why the
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defendant may have behav~d in such n way), or the Juror feels that she or he may have

actcu in a similar fnshion as the defendant in that situation (c.f., defcnfr1e attribution
hypothesis~ Burger, 1981 ), he or she may atteinpt to Jocate responsibility for the event in
tenn:; of the victim's behavior. 1bis type of attribution wm; evident in some of the
personal decision statements as well (e.g.," I would have acted aimost the same if a guy,

after saying no, wouldn't leave me alone. I wouldn't hit him that much though").

Similar types of blame attributions have been previously used as succes.sful defenses in
similar crimes of bias (i.e., Schick v. State, 1991). Furthermore, according to Kelley
(1972), people will give more weight to a fadlitative cause (wmething that promotes that

particular event) than to

}Jn

inhibitory cause (something that would weaken or undermine

that particular event). Therefore even though participants identified the extent of

"provoGation/' they may haYe been lending more weight to the "provocation-prescnf'
~.cenario when deciding between guilty or not guilty, generating no differenc~s in guilt
ratings between the conditions.
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CHAPTER.VI
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current series of studies explored the effects of labeling a crime as hate and
the gender of the victim in both a typical and non-typical hate crime scenario, as well as
the impact of extra-legal factors on bias-motivated assault due to heterosexism. These
studies shed 1ight U!)on the factors being taken into account by decision makers within the
cowtroom (i.e., jurors) in cases of bias~mo6.vated assault. Taken together, these studies
highlight implications for crimes of "hate" in the courtroom.

Although previous stndies inve~tigating perceptions of hate crime noted that
potential jurors viewed the typical hate crime as involving violence and including a
member of a minority group (Craig & Vv'aldo, 1996), the current series of studies reveals
that for a hate crime to simply involve ·1iolence and include a member of a minority

group may not be typical enough for it to be viewed as a hate crime. Events surrounding
the crime as well as characteristics of both the perpetrator and victim c1re important

factors when considering attributions oftlame.
The first hvo studies sought to explore the impact of t:J,.e labeling of a crime as
hate onjuror perceptions and judgments of bias-motivated assat1lt. Study I focused on a

typical hate crime scenario involving same-sex assault motivated by heterosexism. This
study indicated no differences for the labeling of the crime. Study 2 focused on a nontypical hate crime scenario involving opposite-sex assault motivated by gender. The
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findings of study 2 howcv\!r did indicate a difference for ratings of guilt such that
participants having to decide between. not guilty and guilty of a~sault in the first degree

were more likely to choose guilty than those having to decide between not guilty and
· guilty of bias-motivated assault due to gender. It is arguable that both scenarios fit the
notion of assault in the first degree very well. The first study was also quite typical of
people's notions of a hate crime and therefore fit that crime clru::sificationjust as well as
assault in the firs' degree. The second study however wns assault motivated by gender (a
category that

is still being debated as to whether or not it should be included. in hai:e crime

statutes),.a non-typical hate crime scenario. This study ~1id not fit the notion of hate
crime as well and therefore generated differences in juror verdicts based on the labeling
of the crime.
AJthough the original hypotheses of studies I and 2 were not entil'ely supported,
both studies served to highlight differences between a typical and non-typical hate crime
scenario. In typical hate crime scena..-ios, it would seem that giving crimes the label of
bias-motivated ratl:er than another label does not increase nor decrease the rate of
conviction and may therefore serve to punish perpetrators of such crimes more harshly
(i.e., Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancer61ent Act, 1993). For example, by r-harging
someone with first-degree assault motivated by bias rather than first-degree assault it
enhances the penalty that may be handed down were the defendant found guilty. It may
be the case however that labeling crimes as bias-motivated that do not fit the typical
notion of a h~te crime may actually be serving to decrease the conviction rate. Further
studies are needed to explore the extent of '~ypicality" needed for a crime to be set:n as a
hate crime as well as how decisions may be made ifjurors are given more than one fonn
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of guilty option (i.e., guilty of R~sau!t in the first degree or g1Jilty of bia~-rnotivated

assault or not guilty).
Unlike the first two studies, study 3 sought to explore two extra-legal factors that
were mentioned frequently in study 1 personal decision statemer. .ts (i.e., "it wis assadt,
but it was provoked" and "he wasn ,t in a gay bar"). The scenario for study 3 involved a
heterosexual man assaulting a gay man in either a loca~ bar or a gay bar (location) and the

gay man either bought him a drink·and ·walked away or put his arm around him and ast~ed
him to slow dance ("provocation"). Although nG differences were found in the guilt
ratings between location and provocation, once again attributions of blame came into
play. The location of the assnu1t mattered both for how much blame to attribute to the
defenda11t as well as the victim. Participants reading the gay bar scenario attributed more
blame to the defendant and less to the victim. "Provocatior" of the victim also made a
ditforenc~ on how much blame Vi'as attributed to the victim. Those reading the scenario
in which the victim put his

f!nI'

around the defendant and asked him to slow dance

attributed more blam~ to the victim than those reading the scenario in which he simply
buys the defendant a drink and walks away.
Although according to their statements part~cipants seemed to cle:irly delineate
between ~'provocation-present" (e.g. "He made specifiG adwmces even when the
defendant objected, provoking anger, which resulted in the clash" and "He was defending

his personal space") and "provocation-absent" (e.g .. HThe victim realized the defendant
was not interested and walked away JX>litely and then was attacked" and "No one saw the
victim do anything wrong") this did not come into play ,:vhen deciding the guilt or
innocence of 1he def~ndant. According to Kelley ( 1972), people will give more weight to
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a facilitative cause (sornething that promotes that pruiicular · ·.;tmt) than to an inhibitory
cause (something that would weaken or undennine that pan; ular event). Therefore even

though participants identified the extent of "provocationt ti· ;~y may have been lending
more weight to the "provocation-present" scenario when de,, :djng bet\veen guilty or not

guilrv, generating no differences between the conditions.
Aside from the extm-legal factors used. in study 3, p; ~icipants frequeritly made
comments regarding the pres~nce of alcohol in the sccrior,o

1he assault in all studies

tooJ~ place in a bar setting and although the transcript clearly states that the defendant was

not intoxicaterl., many participants made reference to ;ne fact that the use of alcohol

played .some role in foe assault. This 1.:!xtra-legal factoI" is certainly worthy of future note
as other studies have pointed out the importance of .ikohol in violent crimes. For
example, Richardson and Campbell (1980, 1982) fou:ii<l that attributions of blame ru•d

responsibility in a violent encounter depended on th2- nerpetrator's consu..'!1ption nf

alcohol. Similarly, Hammock and Richardson (1991 found that intoxica\ion may be the
factor that both excuses the perpetrator's actions as v, :ll as serves ·i:o blame t.l1evictim in
these types of settings (i.e., violent crimes). Stateme:ts made by parf icipants in the
current series of studies indicated alcohol c;1s both a rcJ.son for the defendant's behavior a~
an excuse (e.g., "Alcohol was involved which mixes with anger r.nd creates bad
decisions" and "He lost control of his rage because he had been drinking") as \.Veil as
poor decision on the part of the victim (e.g., '~She made a choice to drink, knowing it
could affect her judgment" and '(Alcohol was involved on both sider").

Although attribution theory has been up plied in the 3rea of psychology and law in
numerous ways, findings from study 1 did not show differences in nttribution of blame
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based on the event presented in the transcript. lt may be the cac;e that potential jurors c:1rc
relying on previously formed attitudes about the people involved in certain crimes. In
fact, the area of hate crime is new even to the legal arena and being unsure of how the

judgments for such crimes are made, jurors may be making attributions of blame or

responsibility only after other avenues are exhausted. Moreover many of the statements
participants made in thb series of studies aboui. Jegal and/or judicial terms were incorrect
(i.e., intent wru, used to mean pre-meditation), pointing toward an even larger

misunderstanding of the legal system as a whole. Future research may wantto examine

this possibility.
Admittedly, the procedure used in the present study limits how broadly the results
can be generalized. Limitations of the current study include a homogenous participant

sample (e.g., age, ethnicity, sexual orientation) and the use of alcohol in the transcript
scenario (i.e., as a confound. variable). However it is worth noting that the jury

simulation paradigm used was similar to other published research on jury decision
mak.ing (Bornstein, 1999). Also of importance is the fact that the mock jurors used in this
study w~re young college students, who may be mP.re libera. ~n their decision-making for
these typ2s of crimes than older individuals. However, in $everal experiments comparing
judgments of st...tdent and non-student samples, Finkel and ~olleagues found that althongh
non-student samples tended to be older and more heterogeneous demogmphically, there
were typically no differences in verdict or other factors at trial between student and r .:mstudent samples in jury simulation paradigms (Finkel & Duff, 1991; ·Finkel & Handel, ·
l 989; Finkel, Hughes, Smith) & Hurabiell, 1994; Finkel, Hurabiell, & Hughes, 1993a, b;

Finkel, Meister, & Lightfoot, 1991; Fulero & Finkel, 1991). Furthermore, ~!J participants
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made statements regarding the facts of the case and n<1ne were excluded for containing
inc,m·ect i11formation pertaining to the manipulations of the independent varinb]e (i.e.,

participants understood the facts of the case). Although the present results come from a
laboratory-based study ihat employed college students to read a mock trial transcript they

may have profound implications. Further research in this area is wa..rranted as the present
studies demonstrate that there are not only stereotypes for victims of hate crime but that
there may possibly be 1 notion of what events do and do not fit the "typical'~ idea of hate
crime. This is important to legal and psychology scholars as well as fact-finders (i.e.,

jmiges and jurors) within the courtroom because if the event of the crime itself along with
any present extra~legal factors have a larger effect on how judgments are made in these
cases, knowledge about the specific factors at play may serve to be of great consequence.

Conclusion
Taken together, this series of studies provides a greater glimpse into the world of
juror decision-making in some ca<;es of bias-motivated assault. Although attributions of ,
blame seem to come into play regarding the victim's role in these types of crimes, they
do not lend themselves to ratings of guilt in typical hate crime scenarios. In non-typical
hate crime scenarios however, ratings of guilt may stem from attributions of blame.
Other factors affecting typical hate crime scenarios include extra-legnl factors such as
previously held attitudes, location, and "provocation." ·Although. these studies are
exploratory in nature, they do give ·distinct directions in which future research can be
applied ..
Many of the personal decision statements made in the hate crime conditions
included the notion that jurors believed the defendant to be guilty but not of a hate crime
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(i.e.~ "I believe he should be convicted of something but ealling it a hate crime would be
too much"). Future studies should in'!estigate how ratings of guilt may be affected when

given more than one type of guilty clioice in cases of hate crime (i.e., not gui]ty vs. guilty
of assault in the first degree vs. guilty of assault motivated by bias). Other areas for

future study may include differential types of hate crime scenarios (e.g., a heterosexual
person assaulted for supporting gay rights), gender dyads (e.g., a man assaulting a
lesbian), as well as additional extra-legal factors (e.g., perceptions of the role of alcohol

in violent crimes).
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Transcript
Note: This transcript depicts the condition in which participants will read about a samesex attack by a man against a gay man that has been labeled "assault motivated by bias or

a hate crime".
*Names that will be changed depending upon condition appear in italics.

**Definition and/or explanation of ihe crime label that will be changed depending upon
condition will appear in bold italics.
~Judge's OpeningStatement

Judge: Good afternoon. This proceeding is a trial of the defendant, Mr. Daniel Smith,
who has been charged with assault motivated by bias or a hate crime perpetrated against
Mr. James Grear. Mr. Smith is being prosecukd by the District Attorney's office for
committing assault motivated by bias or a hate crime against Mr. Grear. Mr. Smith will
be represented by his lawyer. We will hear opening statements from the prosecution and
defense: TI1is will be followed by direct examination of the prosecution's witnesses and
cross examination by the defense .. Direct examination of the defense witnesses and cross
examination of those witnesses by the prosecution will follow. Each will give closing
statements.
The issue at this trial is whether Mr. Smith committed assault motivated by bias or a hate
crime against Mr. Grear during the evening of May 29th, 2004 at a downtown
Minneapolis, MN bar. The defendant pleaded not guilty. Before the defendant can be
convicted, the State must prove all the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. The fact that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense is
not evidence and must not be considered by you as evidence.
Assault motivated by bias is defined by this state in the following statute:

609.221 Great bodily harm. Whoever assaults another with intent to inflict great bodily
harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years m to payment of a
fine of not more than $30,000, or both. Plus:
Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act (28 U.S.C 994)
Congress enacted afederal complement to state hate crime penalty-enltancement
statutes in the .1994 crime bill. This provision required the United States Sentencing
Commission to increase the pena!tiesfor crimes i11 wlticl, the "''ictim was selected
"because of the actual or perceived race, cu/or, religion, national origin, ethuicity,
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gender, df~ability, or sexual orientation of any perso11." 11ds measure applies to attack'i
and vandalism which occur in natio1tal parks and on federal property.
609.2231 Assaults motivated by bias. (a) Whoever assaults another because of the
victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion 9 sex:, sexual orientation,
disability as defined in sectimi 363A.03, age, or ru:Honal origin may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payme11t of a fine of not more than
$3,000, or both.
·
363A.03 Sexual orientation. "Sexual orientation'1 means having or being perceived as
having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to another person without regard
to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as having an orientation for
sue/, attachment, or having or being perceived as ha1,i11g a self-image or identity not
traditionally associated with one~s- bio/cgical maleness or femaleness. "Sexual
orientation" does not include a physical or sexual attachment to children by an adult.
After all evidence has been heard, you wil! be required to vote on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.

Prosecution's OpeningStatcment

Membe:rs of the jury, Mr. Grear will teUyou how Mr. Smith assaulted him without
provocation or apparent r~gard for anyone in his way. He will also tell you how lifr.
Smith shouted slanderous and derogatory remarks tr. ward him during this attack. Mr.
Grear along with two other witnesses at the bar that evening will testify to the horrific
nature of the crime. This~ ladies and gentlemen, is a clear case of assault motivated by
bias. Tlzfr crime is a hate crime given Hte reason Mrft Grear was attacked is because of
his perceived sexual orientation.
Defense's Opening Statement
Members of the jury, my client, Mr. Smith has been charged with assault motivated by
bias. We will show that there is no evidence whatsoever to find Mr. Smith guilty of a
hate crime. Instead, we will show that lv.fr. Smith was merely defending himself against
the unwanted sexual advances of Mr. Grear and did not intend to cause bodily harm.
This case d-::.-:::s not constitute assault motivated by bias.

Judge: Prosecution, call your first witness.
Prosecution: 111e state calls Mr. James Grear to the stand.
Prosecution Direct Examination of Mr. Grear
P: Mr. Grear cnn you tell us in your own words what happened the night of May 29L",
2004?

JG: Yes. Some friends of mine and I decided to go out, have a few drinks, a little fun,
nothing too crazy, maybe a littl0 dancing. We went to this place {'d never been to before,
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the********. It was pretty nice when we first got there, we had a drink and my friends
went out on the dance floor to dance. I decided to wa'tk around and see if there were any
interesting people, you kno""· Um; then when my friends crune back I was pointing out

this guy that had smiled atme while I was walking around. I said that I thought he was
pretty cute. My friends encouraged me to go talk to him but I was too shy at first. I
passed by him again later on and he smiled and nodded so I said "hi" and just kept
walking. I wish I would have left at that point.
P: So what happened next, Mr. Grear?

JG: I finally got up the courage to go talk to him. I walked over when he was only
talking to one other person ... I didn't want to interr" r~ their conversation so I waited. I
said "hello'' and asked him ifI could buy him a dti.nk. He seemed a little surprised at
first, but then he said "sure". After I introduced myself we talked about what we do for a
living, for fun, you know, just trying to get to know each other, I thought ... then a slow
song came on, one that I really like. I asked him to dance. He pulled away from me and
when he turned back around he punched me in the stomach. I was so surprisca that I just
stood there. The bar was so crowded that I don't think anyone even saw what had
happened. Then he started yelling at
things like, "I don't dance withfags" and
"Keep your queer hands off me, you homo". Then he just started hitting me over and
over again. I backed away and put my arms up, but I couldn't go very far, there were too
many people for me to get away from him quickly. At some point I fell to the gronnd and
the crowd sort of gathered around me and just watched him hitting anci kicking me.
Some girl got hit in the process of trying to get in the way of his punches. Eventually I
blacked out and don't remember anything until I woke up in the emergency room at the
hospital.

me,

P: Did Mr. Smith use a weapon of any sort, other than his fist when he was hitting you?
JG: I don't know. I remember that he had a drink in his hand and I was told at the
hospital that they pulled glass c~t of my arms, but I'm not sure if he hit me with the glass,
or if there was just glass on the floor when I fell or what.
. P: What injuries were you treated for at the hospital?
JG: I had two broken ribs, a broken finger, a broken nose, a concussion, and many cuts
and bruises.

P: Did you receive any stitches for the cuts?
JG: Yes. All together I got 150 stitches in my face, neck, head, and arms.

P: Mr. Grear, why do you think Mr. Smith attacked you?
JG~ I'm not sure. Everything seemed fine and then all ofa sudden he just lost it. From
the things he was yelling at me, I would say that I was at.tacked because I am a gay man.
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P: Mr. Grear, do you think this was a hate crime?
JG: Yes, definite(v.
P: Thank you Mr. Grear. No further questions.

Defense Cross Examination of Mr. Grear

D: Mr. Grear, you just testified that you are a gay man. Was the bar you were at
considered a gaybar?
JG: No, I guess not.
D: Wou]d you s&y that you were ''hitting on'' Mr. Smith at this bar?

JG: No. I mean, I thought he was attract;:.'e and I was curious if he was interested or
not, but I didn~t ask for his number or ask him out for a date or anything like that.

D: But you did ask him to slow dance with you?
JG: Yes.
D: When you were speaking with lvlr. Smith before asking him to dance did you touch
him in any way?
·

JG: I suppose I probably touched his arm when I was talking to him. It was loud in the
bar with the mu:5ic and everything so we had to stand very close to carry on a
conversation.

D: Did Mr. Smifh touch you at all during this conversation?
JG: I don't remember.
D: What was your intentionin speaking with Mr. Smith and asking him to dance?
JG: I guess to find out if he was interested in me or not.

D: Interested how? Sexua1ly?
JG: Romantically maybe, but not sexually. For a possible date. I wasn't t:r;ing to take
anyone home Vvith me that night.

D: Couldn't you have just asked him if he was interested from the start of the
conversation?
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,: I suppose, that just seems a little awkward.

Jvfr. Grear have you approached men in bars that you know t0 not he considered g«Y
bars before?
JG: Yes .

.D: And how have these men responded to your advances?
JG: Depends. Sometimes 1 get a date. Sometimes they say "no thank you". Sometimes
they get lipset and tell me to "fuck-off'.
D: So you haven't always been met with approval in these types of s~ttings?

. JG: No. But I don't think anyone always is.
D: Jsn 'tit a greater risk to you101owing that the person you 're hitting on may not be
gay?

JG: I don't think it makes a difference. If you're not h'.1terested, you're not interested,
regardless of sexual orientation. It's a risk everyone taJces if they're trying to find out if
someone's interested in them or not.
D: You testified that at some point you passed out and don't remember anything after
that, correct?
JG: Yes.

D: Is it p0ssible that someone other than my client may have attacked you?
JG: I only saw Mr. Smith hit me.
D: What about after you passed out?
JG: I guess it's possible.

D: Thank you. ·No further questions.

Prosecution Direct Examination of Witness #1: Mr. Alun Davis - Bartender
P: Mr. Davis, were you working at the ********on the night of May 29th, 2004?

AD: Yes, I was tending bar at the South entrance.
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P: Can you tell me if you recognize the victim, Mr. Grear and defcnd:rn1
from that evening?

.\,fr. S'mith

AD: Yes. I remember both quite well.

P: Can you tell the court what you saw happen that night?
AD: Well, I didn't notice them talking or anything until they ordered drinks from me,
A1r. Grear is actually the one who ordered both drinks. After that I didn't pay much
attention to them, other than to notice that theywere talking. A while later l heard i"vfr.

Smith yelling at Mr. Grear. At first I assumed they were a couple having a fight and then
I saw Mr. Smith punching Mr. Grear. I immediattly called for bouncers to come break it
up and tried to get around the bar to help Mr. Grear who was lying on the floor by now.
I saw Mr. Smith punch and kick him repeatedly. I saw some girl in the crowd try to break
it up and she got hit as well. By the time the bouncers got through the crowd it was
obvious that Mr. Grear was not conc.;cious so I called the ambulance right away. Then I
helped try to clear the crowd out and waited near Mr. Grear until the EMTs arrived.
P: Did you hear anything that was said between .Mr. Grear and the defendant?
AD: I only heard what Mr. Smith was yeliing.
P: What did you hear Mr. Smith yell?
AD: He called Mr. Grear a}Clg and told him to keep his queer hands off him.

P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Mr. Grear?
AD: No, not that I could tell through the crowd.

P: Did you see Mr. Grear hit M,~. Smith in an attempt to fight back or ?thenvise?

AD: No.

P: Thank you Mr. Davis.
Defense Cross Examination. of Witness #1: Mr. Alan Davis - Bartender

D! Mr. Davis, how long have you worked at the********?

AD: Three years.
D: Have you seen numy fights in your bar in those three year~?

AD: I guess so. Fights occur I'd say about once every couple of weeks.
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D: Anyone ever taken to the hospital?
AD= Yes ... it's our policy to caHan ambulance if there is any blood or if anyone is

unconscious.
D: Did you hear the conversation between A1r. Grear and my client, Mr. Smith?
AD: No, I didn't hear anything they were taJking about until ltf,. Smith starting yeilins
obscenities at Mr. Grear.
D: Thank you Mr. Davis. No further questions.
Prosecution Direct Examination of 'Witness #2: Ms. Isabel Salva

P: Ms. Salva, w~re

~'C'J

at the ******:t :~ the night ofMay 29th, 2004?

IS: Yes.

P: Did you see Mr. Grear and tht~ defendant there that night?
IS: Yes I did.

P: Can you tell the court what you sav. 1 relevant to these proceedings that evening?
IS: I was standing at the bar neau\1r. Smith most of the evening. I saw J\,Jr. Grear come
over and start talking to hbn. Then he started to yell at him. I got kind of nervous
because I was standing so close that I couldn't move out of the way when he sort of
shoved him. Then Mr. Smith just starting hitting and kicking him. After he fell to the

ground, I could see he was bleeding and no one was trying to help, so I stepped in the
way of Mr. Smith md tried to get him to stop. I kept telling him "it's not worth it, you'll
get arrested". But then he hit me and kept kicking Mr. Grear.

P: Did you sustain any injuries as a result of trying to help Mr. Grear?
IS: Yes, I had a cut above my eye that I had to get stitches for at the hospitaJ.
P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Mr. Grear?
IS: No.
P: Why do you think M'r. Smith was attacking Mr. Grear?

IS: Because he's gay.
P: What made you think that was the reason?
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IS: Becaus~ of what he wns yelling nt him. lie kept calling him afag and rt q1Jeer nm 1

stt{!f like that.
P: Jfs. Salva, would consider this to be a :.:ri.te crime?

IS: Yes.
P: Thank you, no further questions,

Defense Cross Examination of Witness #2: Ms. Isabel Salva

D: Ms. Salva, you testified that you had been at the bar for a while that night, correct?
IS~ Yes.

D: Were you drinking alcohol at the bar that night?
IS: Yes. I had a few drinks.

D: Would you say you were intoxicated at the time the fight broke out?
IS: Um, probably. They wouldn't let me drive home from the hospital because I was
over the legal limit.

D: Did you hear ~Mr. Grear ask my client to dance?
IS: No. But I did hear him ask .Mr. Smith if he could buy him a drink.

D: How would you describe my client's behavior after the fight broke out?
IS: It was scary. Like he didn't even see or hear me when I was trying to talk to him.
He just kept hitting and kicking, like he was in a trance or something. He seemed very
angry.

D: Thank you Ms. Salva.
Defense Direct Examination of Defendant: Mr. Smith

D: Mr. Smith, can you please tell the court in your own words what happened the night
of May 29th, 2004 at the******** in Minneapolis?
DS: Yes. I went out with a couple of friends to a different club at first, they were trying
to set me up with this chic, but I wasn ~t interested 30 we left. When we got to the
******** I had already had a few drinks, we. were just having a good time. Then this
man comes up to me and asks if he can buy me a drink. I noticed earlier that he was with
a couple of cute girls so I thought maybe one of them \Vas interested lmd sent their friend
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over to talk to me. So he starts h .."1king me all these questions about myself then he starts
touching my arm and Jeaning in closer to talk to me. I started to get a little
uncomfortable so I backed up next to the bar a bit. Then he asks me to dance to a slow
song and I realized that he was hitting on me! Well I'm no fag, so I told him that and I
guess I must of hit him wh~n I turned around. But he still wouldn't leave. He was
completely freaking me out. I thought he was going to grab me and try to kiss me or
something and then I just lost it. I mean he obviously wouldn't take "no" for an answer.

D: Wnat happened then?
DS: I don't remember. I just flipped out and I can kind of remember yelling and then
when the bouncers grabbed me I remember seeing him lying on the ground ... but all the
stuff in between was just anger. Iju~t wanted him to leave me alone.

D: Why didn't you just tell him you weren't interested?

DS: I did. I told him to get his hands off me, but he still wouldn,t leave.
D: Did you intend to harm .Mr. Grear?
DS: No, I just felt scared and wanted him to go away.

D: Do you remember hitting Ms. Salva?
DS: No. I don't r~member seeing her there at all.

D: Were you surprised that Mr. Grear asked you to dance?
DS~ Hell yeah. We weren't in a gay bar or anything ... muybe if we were I would've
expected it or something, but I thought he was asking me questions for one of his friends.

D: Thank you J..,fr~ Smith, no further questions.
Prosecution Cross Exsmination of Dtfendant: !rlr. Smith

P: ft.1r. Smith you said that you had a.lready had a couple of drinks before you got to the
********, ~orrect?

DS: Yes.

P: Did you have too much to drink thatnight?
DS: I don't know,, I mean I wasn~t wasted or anything.

P: You testified that you don't remember part of the evening. Did you black out?
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DS: I guess so .

.P: If you don't think you had too much to drink, what do you think caused you to black
out?
DS: I'm not sure, I was pretty pissed off: maybe I was just too angry.
P: Do you hate gay men?

DS: No. I don't hate them. I don't agree with their lifestyle, but as long as they don't
push it on me, they 're fine.
P:. Did you feel that Mr. Grear was pushing his "lifestyle" on you that evening?
DS: Yes, He was hitting on me.

P: Ard this made you angry?
DS: \Vell, more like scared.

P~ But you blacked out because you were angry?
DS: \Vhen he hlt on me I was scared, but when he wouldn't leave me alone, I got angry.
P: 1 see. Mr. Smith you said that you were at a different bar earlier where you were not
jnterested in someone else. Did this person scare you as well?

DS: No.

P: So you didn't get angry at her and hit her?
DS: No.

P: Why didn't she scare you?
DS: Because she was a woman ... not a gay guy.
P: After l\1r. Grear fell to the floor and became unconscious why did you continue to hit

. '?
him.

DS: I don't remember doing that.
P: Do you conskler yourself to be homophobic A1r. Smith?

DS: No, I have a couple ofJNends whu are gay.

76

P: But ifa gay-man· hits.on you this makes you feel scared?

Yeah·, IJ.ust diqn:'tknow what to do.

o··s:
.

.

.

.

.

. P:·..·Ybu couldn't think of anbther way to. ha!idle the situation other than beating him to.··.
' ..
.
' . .

: the point of unconsciousness and..later. hosp~talization'?
.

,

D~~

..

.

'

.

.

'

'

I. already said I don'fremember doing that. ·

Mr. Smith do you· tl,ink tliis W(JS a /,ate crime.?

P:

'·DS:· No way, I don't hate people just because they're -different than ffl!!, even if[ don't.
·. agree _with \~,hat t~e)J do.
.
.
-'P: Thank_you. No further questions.

· D.efcnse·. Direct Exa~ination of ~witness' #3:· Mr.

D:

Alex Ha.rris - Friend

Jvfr. Harr#, can you please tell us·how you know the defendanp.

AH: Dan and I are· goqd frienqs.

·we'-ve known each other for .about four years.·
.

'

.: D::· ·Were ·you out ·wi~h lvfr. Smith jlie night of May 29th?
.

'

.

AS: ·Yes.·

.

.

'

.

'

·. ·. D: Did you see him talking with Mr. Grear?
AH:. Yes.
.

'

D: How would you descnbe his actions after tlie fight. broke out?
A:Jf:· l've never seen him.like that.. Fie seemed completely freaked out.·
Have )'OU ever seen him in a fig~t before?

·D:

.

'

.

.

'

..

AH: No, never ... He can always find a reason to walk away.

:o: Why .do you. think this fight happened?
.

.

~H:·

,,

I don't know .. It had:to be something big .for him to go off like that.

D: What kind
of.person would y~u characterize
Mr. Sn1ith to be?·. .
.
.
.

'

'

.

Al-I:' A good person; He is very caring; loyal, and he loves ·his family~. He's just an all.. around great friend.
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D: Wou]d you consider _Mr. Smith to be homophobic?·
.

.

'

,,

.

.

.

'

AH: No. I've never heard'hl'm say~a bad thin·g about homosexuals. ..
. D: Thank you lvfr.. Harr1s ..
Prosec.ution Cross· Examination of Witness #3: · Mr. Alex Harris - Fri.e~d

P: Afr. Harris, you.have known the defendant for four years and he.b~ never been in a
. fight.t~at. yo~ ~ow of? . .
.
.
.
.
.
. AH.: Nothing bigger.than.ah argument.
.

.

.

.

'

.

.

'.

.

'

.

P:·.. You said t~athe·."freakedout", what do you mean by that?.
AH: He just didn't seem like hi.mse(f; like he was in a rage or something.
P:. To.your
knowledge
has·J\,1r. Smith
ever been
hit pn bya
member ofthe same sexprior
. 'ti
.
.
.
.
.
to .May 29 1.? :. .
· .. ·
·
. . ·
.
.. . .

AH:.Yeah; at .a gay barwe went to with somefemalefrien.ds once
P: And how did'/w react in tha( situation?
AH: /le seemed, fine. He made jokes about it and we sort of teased him a little.
P: He made:jokes about it? .What kind of jokes? ·

AH: Nothing bad, just how he's hot enough to attract members of both sexes. Stuff like
that.

.,

P: Was he polite to the person that hit on him then? ·
.

.

'

.

'

.· AH: Yeah .. i-Ie ju.st ·said he was straight and the man left him alone.
P: Mr. Smith testified that he disagrees with the lifestyle ofgay men and.lesbians. Wny
wouldhe go to a gay bar?
.
.

AH: We went for a friend's birthday. party.
P: . Mr. Harris, why didn't you do anything to stOp the attack on Mr. Grear th.at night? .

AH: At first I didn't know what was happening and I wasn't sure· why the fight had .
. started in the first'place. After he fell to the ground I tried to get over to Dan to talk him
down, but the cro.wd was too full and I couldn't get through~
.
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P: Thank yo,1. No fm•her questions.

Prosecution Closing Statement
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is no dispute that Mr. Smith violently attacked
Mr. Grear the night of May 29th, 2004. All of the witnesses here, including )\!fr. Smith's
own friend, saw him and only him, hit and kick Afr. Grear repeatedly. Afr. Grear
incurred a number of ii\juries and spent a few days in the hospital as a resuJt of this
attack. Both Mr. Grear and two other witnesses testified to the slanderous and
derogatory remarks that he shouted toward his victim before and during the attack.
Ladies and gentlemen, this clearly shows intent on the part of Mr. Smith to illl4.ict hann
on his victim. After hearing the words that were shouted during the attack, there should
be no doubt that Mr. Smith is guilty of assault motivated by bias and according to the
hate crime sentencing enhanceme11t act, should be punished accordingly. Thank you for
your time.
Defense Closing Statement
Jury members, although others present that evening say they witnessed my client
attacking Mr. Grear, he does not remember that at all. Ladies and gentlemen, my client
was so frightened and eventually ~ngered by the actions of Mr. Grear that he simply
reacted poorly to a bad situat~on. My client,Mr. Smith did not intend to harm Mr. Grear.
His only intention was to defend himselfagainst the sexual advances of a gay man. This
case lacks the intent needed to constitute assault. Furthermore, tltis case is not a hate
crime as my clie11t did not seek out Mr. Grear hecatJSe he was gay. He simply wanted
him to leave him alone. I am certain that you will find my client, Mr. Smith not guilty.
Thank you.

Judge's Closing Statement
Members of the jury, you have heard all the arguments presented by both the District
Attorney and defense lawyer and are now required to come to a decision regarding the
gailt or innocence of Mr. Smith.
Jury members are reminded that in order to find Mr. Smith guilty of assault motivated by
bias or a hate crime, there must be sufficient evidence that there was intent to inflict
great bodily harm to tlae victim a11d t/,at tl,e victim in thi.~ case was assaulted because of
his actual or perceived sexual orie11tation. The State must prove all of the essential
elements of the crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is not
required to prove guilt beyond all doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Appendix B
Questionnaires
Heterosexism Scale
This questionnaire is designed to measure the way you feel about associating with gay
men and/or lesbians. It is not a test, so thereis no right or wrong at13wers. Answer each
item as carefully and accurately as you can by placing a number in the blank at the
beginning of each question according to the following scale:

l

Strongly agree

2

Agree somewhat

3
4
5

Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree somewhat
Strongly disagree

___ 1. I would enjoy attending social functions at which gay men and/or lesbians were
present.
___ 2. I would feel uncomfortable if I learned that my neighbor was gay.
_ _ 3. If a member of my own sex made a sexual advance toward me I would feel
angry.
___ 4. I would feel comfortable knowing that I was attractive to members of my own
sex.
____ 5. I would feel uncomfortable being seen in a gay bar.
___ 6. I would feel comfortable if a member of my sex made an advance toward me.
_ _ 7. I would be comfortable if I found myself attracted to a member of my own sex.
_ _ 8. I would feel disappointed ifl learned that my child was gay.
_ _ 9. I would feel nervous being in a group of gay men and/or lesbjans.
_ _ 10. I would feel comfortable knowing that my clergyman/woman was gay.
_ _ 11. I would be upset if I learned that my brother or sister was gay.
___ 12. I would feel that I had failed a<:> a parent if I learned that my child was gay.
- · - 13. Ifl saw two men holding hands in public I would feel disgusted.
_ _ 14. If a member of my sex made an advance toward me I would be offended.
15. I would feel comfortable ifl learned that my daughter's teacher was a lesbian.
_ _ 16. I would feel uncomfortable if I learned that my spouse or partner was attracted
to members of his or her own sex.
_ _ 17. I would feel at ease talking with a gay person at a party;
___ 18. I would feel uncomfortable kissing a close friend of my own sex in public.
----~ 19. It would not bother me to walk through a predominantly gay section of town.
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_ _ 20. lt would disturb me to find out that my doctor was gay.
_ _ 21. I would feel comfortable if I leamed that my best friend of my own sex was

gay.
____ 22. If a member of my own sex made an advance toward me I would feel flattered.
___ 23. I would feel uncomfortable knowing that my son's male teacher was gay.
Demographic Questionnaire
Please provide the following information:
Age:.
Sex:

___Female
_ _Male
_ _Prefer not to say

Race: _ _African American/ Black
___Asian American
_ _Caucasion I W ~...ite
_ _Hispanic
_ _Native American

___Other; _ _ _ _ _._ _ _ __
_ _Prefer not to say
Sexual Orientation:
_ _ Heterosexual
___Gayman
___Lesbian
_ _Bisexual
_ _Prefer not to say
Level of Education:
_ _First Year
___Sophomore

4
. '

Junior
Senior

_ _Grad Student
_ _Other/Prefer not to say

Home" state (i.e., state in which you have lived most of your life): _ _ _ _ _ _ __

State Y'-)u live in now: _ __
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Individual Juror Ve.r<lict
Juror Number:·--On the basis of the evidence, my vote is that Daniel Smith is:
Guilty of Assault motivated by bias (hate crime)
Not-guilty_ _ _ __

Private Belief Rating Scale

Juror#- - - - - -

With this questionnaire, you are being asked to circle the one number that best describes
your private belief that Daniel Smith should or should not be convicted of assault. You
are not being asked to state whether you believe there is sufficient evidence to convict in
a court. of law. Rather, it is asking about your persona] and private belief.
Please circle one number that best describes your private belief about whether Daniel
Smith should or should not be convicted.
-3
-5
-4
Certain Daniel Smith
Should NOT BE
Convicted

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+3
+4
+5
Certain Daniel Smith
SHOULD BE
Convicted

Perceptions

Juror Number:- - - - · Given the following rating scale, please indicate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with the following statements.
·

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Strongly
Disagree
0

1

2

3

Strongly
Agree
4

5

6

1. The victim is partly to blame for the actions of the defendant.
___ 2. The defendant is solely to blame for the events that took place in the bar that

evemng.
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3. The defendant's actions are not the results 0f the victim's sexual micntation.

4. The defendant's actions were reasonable.
5. The victim should know to be more careful about approaching someone

whose sexual orientation is unknown.
___ 6. The defendant's actions were the result of unwanted advances by the victim.
____ 7. The defendant deliberately intended to inflict injury on the victim.
8. The defendant's actions were under his control.
9. The defendant was provoked.

10. The defendant's actions were justified.
11. The victim deserved it.
12.. Any reasonable man would have acted the same as the defendant.
13. The defendant is mentally unstable.
_ _ 14. The victim is mentally unstable.
15. The defendant committed a hate crime.

Personal Decision
Juror#- ~ - - - - -

l. Please list, as briefly as possible, the reasons for your personal decision in this case.
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Appendix C

Informed Consent Form: Perceptions of Crime
My name is Karyn P]umm, ram conducting a study under the supervision of Dr. Cheryl
Terrance, a professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of North Dakota, to
examine people's perceptions of crime. Tliis study will take approximately 1 to 2 hours to
complete.
Y011 are invited t~. participate in a study in which we will ask you to read a transcript of a
simulated criminal trial wherein the defendant is being accused of assaulting a person in a public
bar setting. As prut of the study you will as well be asked to respond to questionnaires pertaining
to your views about the case, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The benefits from this research will be a better understanding of how people render
decisions in similar cnses. Specific benefits to you for your participation will be a better
understanding of what psychologic~J research is about. As compensation for your participation
you wiJI have the opportunity to earn extra credit in your current psychology class. Some people
may find the issues involved in this crimina] trial to be offensive and/or upsetting, and you are
under no obligation to continue with the study. Should you feel upset to the degree that you need
assistance, contact numbers for agencies have been provided at the bottom of this const!nt form.
Services listed are free of charge. Any charges for services that may arise are the responsibility
of the participant.
·

Some participants may focl a little apprehensive because this is an evaluative situaticn, or
may feel anxious responding to questions pertaining to personally sensitive issues. You do not
have to respond to any questions that you do not want to, and all data will remain confidential and
anonymous with respect to your personal identity: To insure privacy concerns, participants will
be given numerical identification numbers for processing the data and your names will not be
revealed in presentation or publication of the study. Only the researcher, her advisor, research
assistants, and people who audit IRB procedures v,1ill have access to the data. Questionnaires will
be stored separately from consent fonns in a locked cabinet in Dr. Terrance's research lab for a
minimum period of 3 years.
Participation is volunta1y. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect
your future relations with UNO. If you decide to participate, you are fre~ to discontinue
participation at any time without prejudice. A copy ofthi~ consent form will be made available to
you. If you have any questions about this research, you may ask Karyn Plumm at 777-4779.
Alternatively, you may contact Dr. Cheryl Terrance at 777-3921. If you have any other questions
or concerns, p1~ase caJI Research Development and Compliance at 777-4279.
·
I have read all of the above and willingly agree to participate in this study.

ParticipanCs Name

Date

Contact Information:

University of North Dakota Counseling Center
Altru Health System
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777-2127
780-5900

Appendix D
Classification Schema; Study 1

Statements mad1 JY participants·from the Personal Decision questionnaire were classified
into six types ( .. arguments used to support their decision in the case. This table provides
· examples of statementE: made.

1. LegaJ Arguments

"She is guilty. It was not self-defense."
HHe kept hitting and kicking him with intent to harm him."
Not Guilty

"I feel it is not a hate crime because he did not seek him out based on his
sexual orientation, he just dealt with the situation vrrongly."
"The evidence in the trial did not prove her intent to assault her."
2. Physical Evidence

Guilty
"She was yelling at her using derogatory terms in reference to her sexual
orientation."
'~He beat him repeatedly even while he was unconscious."

Not Guilty
"She said she did not like her touching her but no one could prove she was
acting out."
"She asked her to leave her alone."
3. Morality Statements

Guilty
"Gays shoukl not be persecuted for who they are."
~'Violence never solves anything, walking away is an option."

Not Guilty
"I would have acted almost. the same if a guy after saying no wouldn't
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leave me alone. I wouidn ~t hit him that much though."
"I probably would have reacted likewi~c.~'

4. Victim.. Related Statement~
Guilty

HShe clearly attacked her because she was a lesbian."
"He did not mean to off'~nd him by hitting on him.'~
Not Guilty
"The victim wouldn't take
"The victim 'pushed it'."

n0

for an answer."

5. Witness and/or Perpetrator Credibility
Guilty
"Her account for what happened was BS."
"Even though he can't remember, there were witnes~.es to prove his
actions.n

Not Guilty
"It was a one-time incident. His previous record showed he wasn't
abusive to homosexuals."
"He's considered a great guy."
6. Extra-Legal :Factors

Guilty
"Even though she was intoxicated she had a sense of what she was doing.'"
"She wasn't physically provoked.''

Not Guilty
"He wasn't in a gay bar."
"He was drinking, uncomfortable, and in a bad situation."
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Appendix E
Transcript
Note: This transcript depicts the condition in which participants wilI read about an
opposite-sex attack by a man against a woman that has been labeled "assault motivated
by bias or a hate crime".
*Names that will be changed depending upon condition appear in italics.
**Definition and/or explanation of the crime label that will be changed dep~nding upon
condition will appear in bold italics.
Judge's Opening Statement
Judge: Good afternoon. This proceeding is a trial of the defendant, Mr. Daniel Smit.1,
who has been charged with assault motivated by bias or a hate crime perpetrated against
Ms. Jane Grear. Mr. Smith is being proscc~ted by the District Attorney's office for
committing assault motivated by bias or a hate crime against Ms. Grear. Afr. Smith will
be represented by his lawyer. We will hear opening statements from the prosecution and
defense. This will be followed by direct examination of the prosecution's witnesses and
cross examination by the defense. Direct examination of the defense witnes~~s and cross
examination of those witnesses by the prosecution ,vill follow. Each will give closing
statements.
The issue at this trial is whether Mr. Smith committed assault motivated by bias or a hate
crime against .1.Ms. Grear during the evening of May 29th, 2004 at a downtown
Minneapolis, MN bar. The defendant pleaded not guilty. Before the defendant can be
convicted, the 'State must prove all the essential elements of thP '"r+~::.:: !::~·:,uu a
reasonable doubt. The fact that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense is
not evidence and must not be considered by you as evidence.

Assa,l.lt motivated by bias is defined by this state in the following statute:
609.221 Great bodily harm. \Vhoever assaults another \\iith intentto inflict great bodily
harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a
fine of not more than $30,000, or both. Plus ...

Hate Crime Sentencing Enha11ceme11t Act (28 U.S.C 994)
Congress enacted a.federal complement to state hate crime pe11a'ity-enhallceme11t
statutes in the 1994 crime hill. This provision required the United States Sentencing
Comm1:\'Sim1. to increase the penalties for crimes in whiclt the victim was selected
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"hecause of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, nationalorigin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual oriet;fation of any person~" This mearnre applies to attacks
and vandalism which occur in rwtional parks and on federal property,
60Y.2231 Assau/ts motivated by bias. (a) Whoever assaults another because of lite

victim's or another's actual or perceived race, cu/or, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
disahllity as defined in section 363A.03, age, or natio11al origin may be sentenced to
irnprisonmentfor not more titan one year or to payment of a.fine of not more than
$31.000, or both.

After all evidence has been heard, you will be required to vote on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
Prosecution's Opening Statement

Members of the jury, Ms. Grear ,vill tell you how Afr. Smith assaulted her without
provocation or apparent regard for anyone in his way. She will also tell you how Mr
Smith shouted slande ..ous and derogatory remarks toward her during this attack. Ms.
Grear a~ :ng with two other witnesses at the bar that evening will testify to the horrific
nature of the crime. This, ladies and gentlemen) is a clear case of assault motivated by
bias. Tltis crime is a ltate cri1ne given tlte reason Ms. Grear was attacked is because of
her sex. (gender).
Defense's Opening Statement

Members of the jury, my client, A1r. Smith has been charged with assault motivated by
bias. We will show that there is no evidence whatsoever to find lvfr. Smith guilty of a
!tale crime. Instead, we will show that Mr. Smith was merely defending himselfagainst
the unwanted sexual advances of Afs. Grear and did not intend to cau.se bodily hann.
This case does not constitute assault motivated by bias.
Judge: Prosecution, caJl your first witness.

Prosc.cution: The state calls Ms. Jane Grear to the stand.
Prosecution Direct Examination of Ms. Grear
P: .,\Ifs. Grear can you tell us in your own words what happened the night of May 29t\
2004?
JG: Yes. Some friends of mine and I decided to go out, have a few drinks, a little fun,
nothing too crazy, maybe a little dancing. We went to this plac~ I'd never been to before,
the ********. It was pretty nice when we first got there, we had a drink and my friends
went out on the <lane~) floor to dance. I decided to walk around and see if there were any
interesting people, you know. Um. then when my friends ca.me back I was pointing out
this guy that had smiled at me while I was walking around. I said that I thought he was
pretty cute. My friends encouraged me to go talk to him but I was too shy atfirst. I

88

passed by him again later on and he smiled and nodded so I said ''hi" and just kept
walking. I wish I would have left at that point.

P:

·so what happened next, Ms. Grear?

JG: I finally got up the courage to go talk to him. I walked over when he was only
talking to one other person ... I didn't want to interrupt their conversation so I waited. I
said Hhello" and asked him if I could buy him a drink. He seemed a little surprised at
first, but then he said "sure". After I introduced myself we talked about what we do for a
living, for fun, you know, just trying to get to know eac:1 other, I thought. .. then a slow
song came on, one that I really like. I asked him to· d~uice. He pulled away from me and
when he turned back around he punched me in the stomach. I was so surprised that l just
stood there. The bar was so crowded that I don't think anyone even saw what had
happened. Then he start'ed yelling at me, things like, "I don't dance with dumb bitches"
and "Keep your hands off me, you whore". Then he just started hitting me over and over
again. I backed away and put my anns up, but I couldn't go very far, there were too
many people for me to get away from him quickly. At some point I fell to the ground and
the crowd sort of gathered around me and just watched him hitting and kicking me.
Some girl got hit in the process of trying to get in the way of his punches. Eventually I
blacked out and don't remember anything until I woke up in the emergency room at the
hospital.

P: Did Mr. Smith use a weapon of any sort, other than his fist when he was hitting you?
jG: J don't know. I remember that he had a drink in his hand and I was told at the
hospital that they pulled glass out of.my arms, but I'm not sure if he hit me with the glass,
or if there was just glass on the floor when I fell or what.
P: \Vhat injuries were you treated for at the hospital?
,JG: I had two broken ribs, a broken finger, a broken nose, a concussion, and many cuts
and bruises.

P: Did you receive any stitches for the cuts?
JG: Yes. All together I got 150 stitches in my face, neck, head, and anns.

P: Als. Grear, why do you think Afr. Smith attacked you?
JG: I'm not sure. Everything seemed fine and then all of a sudden he just lost it From
the things he was yelling at me, I would say that I was attacked because he hates women.

P: Iv.ts. Grer,.r, doyou thlnk this was a ltate crime?

JG: Yes, definitely.
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P: Thank you A1s. Grear. No further questions.
Defense Cross Examination of Ms. Grear

D: Ms. Grear, would you say that you were "hitting on" Mr. Smith at this bar?
JG: No. I mean, I thought he was attractive and I was curious if he was interested or
not? but I didn't ask for his number or.ask him out for a date or anything like that.

D: But you did ask him to slow dance with you?

JG: Yes.
D: When yo11 were speaking with Mr. Smith before asking him to dance did you touch
him in any way?

JG: I suppose I probably touched his arm when I was talking to him. It was loud in the
bar with the music and everything so we had to stand very close to cany on a
conversation.

D: Did Mr. Smith touch you at all during this conversation?
QJG: I don't remember.
D: \.Vhat was your intention in speaking with Mr. Smith and. asking him to dance?
· JG: I guess to find out if he was interested in me or not.

D~ Interested how? Sexually?
JG: Romantically maybe, but not sexually. For a possible date. I wasn't trying to take .
anyone home "With me that night.
D: Couldn't you have just asked him if he was interested from the start of the
conversation?
JG: I suppose, that just seems a little awkward.
D: Ms. Grear hav · JOU approached men in bars before?
JG: Yes.

D: And how have these men responded to your advances?
JG: Depends; Sometimes I get a date. Sometimes they say "no thank you". Sometimes
they get upset and tell me to "fuck-off".
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D: So you haven't always been met with approval in these types of settings?
JG: No. But I don't think anyone always is.

D: You testified that at some point you passed out and don't remember anything after
thnt, correct?
JG: Yes.

D: Is it possible that someone other than my client may have attacked you?
JG: I only saw Mr. Smith hit me.

D: What about after you passed out? .

.JG: r guess it's possible.
D: Thank you. No further questions.

Prosecution Direct Examination of Witness #1: Mr. Alan Davis - Bartender
P: Mr. Davis, were you working at the ********on the night of May 29th, 2004?
AD: Yes, I was tending bar at the South entrance.

P: Can you tell me if you recognize the victim, Ms. Grear and defendant, }Jr. Smith
from that evening?
AD: Yes. I remember both quite well.

P: Can you tell the court what you saw happen that night?

AD: Well, I didn't notice them talking or anything until they ordered drinks from me,
!vis. Grear is actually the one who ordered both drinks. After that I didn't pay much
attention to them, other than to notice that they were talkjng. A while later I heard A1r.
Smith yelling at Ms. Grear. At first I assumed they were a couple having a fight and then
I saw Mr. Smith punching Ms. Grear. I immediately called for bouncers to come break it
up and tried to get around the bar to he]p Ms. Grear who was lying on the floor by 1:ow.
I saw Mr. Smith punch.and kick her repeatedly. I saw some girl in the crowd try to break
it up and she got hit as well. By the time the bouncers got through the crowd it was
obvious that Jvfs. Grear was not conscious so I called the runbulance right av,ay. Then I
helped try to clear the crowd out and waited near Ms. Grear until the EMTs arrived.
P: Did you hear anything that was said between Mr;. Grear and the defendant?

91

AD; I only heard wh~t Mr. Smith was yelling.

P~ What did you hear Mr. Smith yell?
AD: He calJed Jvfs. Grear a dumb bitch and told her to keep her hands off him.
P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Ms. Grear?

AD: No, not that I could tell through the crowd.

P: Did you see Ms. Grear hit lo.Jr. Smith in an attempt to fight back or otherwise?
AD: No.

P: Thank you Mr. Davis.

Defense Cross Examimation of \Vitncss #1 ~ Mr. Alan J)avis - Bartender
D: Mr. Davis, how long have you worked at the****~***?
AD: Three years;

D: Have you seen many fights in your bar in those three years?
AD: I guess so. Fights occurl'd say about once every couple of weeks.

D: Anyone ever taken to the hospital?

AD: Yes ... it's our policy to call an ambulance if there is any biood or if anyone is
unconscious.

D: Did you hear the conversation between Ms. Grear and my client, Afr. Smith?
AD: No, I didn't hear anything they were talking about until A1r. Smith starting yelling
obscenities at Ms. Grear.
D: Thank you Mr. Davis. No further questions.
Prosecution Direct Examination of Witne;Ss #2: Ms. Isabel Salva
P: Ms. Salva, were you at the******** the night of May 29th, 2004?
IS: Yes.

P: Did you see Ms. Grear and the defendant there that night?

92

IS: Yes I did.

P: Can you tell the court what you saw relevant to these proceedings that evening'?
IS: I was standing at the bar near A1r. Smith most of the evening. I saw Ms. Grear come
over and start talking to him. Then he started to yell at her. I got kind of nervous
because I was standing so close that I couldn,t move out of the way when he sort of
shoved her. Then Mr. Smithjust started hitting and kirking her. After she fell to the
ground, I could see she was bleeding ,md no one was trying to help, so I stepped in the
way of Mr. Smith and tried to get him to stop. I kept telling him "it's not worth h, you'll
get atTested". But th~n he hit me and kept kicking Mr,. Grear.

P: Did you sustain any injuries as a result of trying to help Nls. Grear?
IS: Ycs, I had a cut above my eye that I had to get stitches for at the hospital.

P~ Did you see anyone else hit or kick Ms. Grear?
IS: No.

P: Why do you· think Mr. Smith was attacking A1s. Grear?
IS: Because he obviously hates women.
P: What made you think that was the reason?

IS: Because of what he was yelling at her. He kept calling her a dumb bltch and saying
things like "only sluts hit on strangers in bars'~.
P:

}tlfs.

Salva, would you consider this to be a hate crime?

IS: Yes.
P: Thank you, no further questions.
Defense Cross Examination of Witness #2: Ms. Isa be: Salva
D: Ms. Salva, you testified that you had been at the bar for a while that night, correct?
IS: Yes.

D: Were you drinking alcohol at the bar that night?

IS~ Yes. I had a few drinks.
D: Would you say you were intoxicated at the time the fight broke out?
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IS: Um, probably. They wouldn't let me drive home from the hospital because I was
over the legal limit.

D: Did you hear .!'vis. Grear ask my client to Janee?
IS: No. But I did hear her ask Mr. Smith if she could buy him a drink.

D: I-Iow would you describr;; my client's behavior after the fight broke out?
IS: It was scary. Like he didn't even see or hear me when I was trying to talk to him.
He just kept hitting and kicking like he was·in a trance or something. He seemed very
1

angry.

D: Thank you Ms. Salva.

Defense Direct Examina~.ion of Defendant: Mr. Smitlt
D: lvfr. Smith, can yoa please tell the court in your own words what happened the night
of May 29t11, 2004 at the******** in Minneapolis?
DS: Yes. I went out with a couple of friends to a different club at first, they were trying
to set me up with this chic, but I wasn't interested so we left. When we zot to the
******** I had already had a few drinks, we were just having a good time. Then this
woman comes up to me and asks if she can buy me a drink. I noticed earlier that she was
with a couple of other cute girls so I thought maybe one of them was interested nnd sent

their friend over to talk to me. So she starts asking me all these questions about myself
then she starts touching my ann and leaning in closer to talk to me. I started to get a little
uncomfortable so I backed up next to the bar a bit. Then she asks me to dance to a slow
song and I realizecl that she was hitting on me I Well I told her that I don't dance with
people I don't know and I guess I mnst of hit her when I turned around. But she Rt ill
wouldn't leave. She was completely freaking me out. I thought she was going to grab
me and try to kiss me or something and then I just lost it. I mean she obviously wouldn't
take "no'' for an answer.

D: What happened then?
DS: I don't remember. I just flipped out and I can kind of remember yelling and then
when the bouncers grabbed me l remember seeing her lying on the ground ... but all the
stuff in between was just anger. I just wanted her to leave me alone.
D: Why didn't you just tell her you weren't interested?
DS: I did. I told her to get her hands off me, but she still wouldn't leave.

D: Did you intend to harm Ms. Grear?
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DS: No, I just felt freaked out and wanted her to go away.

D: Do you remember hitting Ms. Salva?
OS: No. I don't remember seeing her there at all.
D: Were y0u surprised that Ms. Grear asked you to dance?

DS: Hell yeah. I thought she had come over to talk to me about one of her friends.

D: Thank you Mr. Smith, no further questions.
Prosecution Cros$ Examination of Defendant: Mr. Smith

P: Mr. Smith you sftid that you had already had a couple of drinks before you got to the
***H ~**, correct?
1

DS: Yes.
{>:

Did you have too much to drink that night?

DS: I don't know, I mean I wasn't wasted or anything.
P: You testified that you don't remember part of the evening. Did you black out?
DS: I guess so.
P: If you don't think you had too much to drink, what do you think caused you to black
out?

DS: I'm not sure, I was pretty pissed off, maybe I was just too angry.

P: Do you hate women?
DS: No. I don't hate them. I've had plenty of gir/fr;ends. I just don't like it when
people try to push themselves on you when you're not interested.

P: Did you feel that Ms. Grear was pushing herself on you that evening?

DS: Yes. She was hitting on me.
P: And this made you angry?
DS: Well, more like freaked out.
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P: But you blacked out because you were angry?
DS: When she hit on me I was freaked out, but when she wouldn't leave me alone, I got
angry.
P: I see. Mr. Smith you said that you were at a differentbar earlier where you were not
intereste<l in someone else. Did this person freak you out as well?
DS: No.

P: So you didn't get angry at her and hit her ?
DS: No.
P: Why didn't she scare you?

DS: Because she wasn't forcing herself on me.
P: After Ms. Grear fell to the floor and became unconscious why did you continue to hit

her?

DS: I don't remember doing that.
P.: Mr.. Smith do you think this was a hate crime?

DS: No way, I don 'thate women.
P: Than..'t< you. No further questions.
Defense Direct Examination of Witness #3: Mr. Afox Harr!s - Friend

D: Mr. Harris, can you please tell us how you know the defendant?
AH:Dan.and I are good friends. We've known each other for about four years.

D: Were you out with Mr. Smith the night of May 2911'?

AH: Yes.
D: Did you see him talking with M~'. Grear?

AH: Yes.
D: How would you describe his actions after the fight broke out?

· AH: I've never seen him like that. He seemed completely freaked out.
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D: Have you ever seen him in a fight before'}

AH: No, never. He can always find a reason to walk away.
D: Why do you think this fight happened?
AH: I don't know. It had to be something big for him to go off like that.
D: What kind of person would you characterize Jvfr. Smith to be?
AH: A good person. He is very caring, loyal, and he loves his family. He's just an allaround great friend.
D: Do you think Mr. Smith hates 1-vomen?

AH: No.
D: Thank you Mr. Harris.
Prosecution Cross Examination of Witness #3: Mr. Alex Harris - ·Friend
P: Mr. Harris, you have known the defendant for four years and he has never been in a
fight that you know of?
AH: Nothing bigger than an argument.

P: You said that he "freaked out", what do you mean by that?
AH: He just didn't seem like himself, like he was in a rage or something.
P: To your knowledge has someone ever·made an unwanted sexual advance toward Afr.

Smith prior to May 29th?
AH: Yeah, at bars we hang out at all the time.

P: And how did he react in those situations?
AH: He seemed fine. He made jokes about it and we sort of teased hfm a little.
P: He made jokes about it? What kind of jokes?
AH: Nothing bad, just how he's hot enough to attract any woman.
P: Was he polite to the person that hit on him then?
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AH: Yeah. He just said he wasn't interested and the woman left him alone.
P: Mr. Ha1Tis, why didn't you do anything to stop the attack on 1\t!s. Grear that night?

AH: At first I didn't know what was happening and I wasn't sure why the figilit had
started in the first place. After she feJl to the ground I tried to get over to Dan to talk him
down, but the crO\vd was too full and I couldn't get through.
P: 'Ibank you. No further quest.ions.
Prosecutfon ·:Closiug Sb~tcment
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is no dispute that Jvlr. Smith violently attacked
1

lvfs. Grear the night of May 29° , 2004. All of the witnesses here, including Mr. Smith's

o'v'vn friend, sa\v Mm and on'ly him, hit and kick Ms. Grear repeatedly. Ms. Grear
~.1curred a nm:1ber of injurks and spent a fow days in the hospital as a result of this
attack. Both Af;. Gn:tzr and two other witnesses testified to the slanderous and
derogatory remarks that he shouted toward his victim before and during the attack.
Ladies and gentl~men, this clearly shows intent on the part of }vfr. Smith to inflict harm
on his victim. After hearing the words that were shouted during the attack, there should
be no doubt that ivfr. Smith is guilty of assault motivated by bias and according to the
hate crime .tentencing enhanceme11t act, should be punished accordingly. Thank you for
your thm;.
Defense Closing Statement

Jury members, although others present that evening say they witnessed my client
attacking lvfs. Grear, he does not remember that at all. Ladies and gentlemen, my client
was so frightened and eventually angered by the actions of Ms. Grear that he simply
reacted poorly to a bad situation. My client, Mr. Smith did not intend to harm Ms. Grear.
His only intention was to defend himself against an unwanted sexual advance. This case
lacks the intent needed to constitute assault. Furtltermore, iltis case is not a hate crime
as my client did not seek out M~. Grear because she was female. He simply wanted her
to leave him alone. I am certain that you will find my client, Mr. Smith not guilty.
Thank you.
Judge's Closing Statement

Members of the jury, you have heard all the argurr.ents presented by both the District
Attorney and defense lawyer and are now required to come to a decision regarding the
guilt or innocence of Mr. Smith.

Jury membe"'.'s are reminded that in order to find Mr. Smith guilty of assault motivated by
bias or a hate crime, there must be sufficient evidence that there was intent to inflict
great bodily harm to the victim and that the victim in this case was assaulted because of
her actual or perceived sex (gender). The State must prove all of the essential elements
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oft.he crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is not required to
prove guilt beyond all doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Appendix F
Questionnaires
Demographic Questionnaire

Please provide the following information:
Age:
Sex:

Female

Male

____ Prefer not to say
Race: ___African American/ Black
Asian American

___Caucasion / White
_ _Hispanic

___Native American
Other:- - _ _Prefer not to say
Sexual Orientation:
Heterost":ual
___Gayman
Lesbian

Bisexual
___Prefer not to say
Level of Education:.
First Year
_ _ Sophomore

Junior
Senior

Grad Student
_ _Other/Prefer not to say

"Home" state (Lr., state in which you have lived most of your lifo): _ _ _ _ _ __

State you live in now: __________
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Individual Juror Verdict

Juror Number: . _ __
On the basis of the evidence, my vote is that Daniel Smith is:
Guilty of Assault motivated by bias (ltate crime)_ _ _ _ _ __
Not-guilty_ _ __

Private Belief Rating Scale
Juror#
With this questionnaire, you are being asked to circle the one number that best describes

your private belief that Daniel Smith should or should not be convicted of assault. You
are not being asked to state whether you believe there is sufficient evidence to convict in
a court of law. Rather, it is asking about your personal and private belief.
Please circle one number that best describes your private belief about whether Daniel
Smith should or should not be convicted.
-4
-5
-3
Certain Daniel Smith

-2

-i

0

+1

Should NOT BE

+2

+4
+5
Certain Daniel Smith
SHOULD BE
+3

Convicted

Convicted

Perceptions
Juror Number:

Given the following rating scale, please indicate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with the following statements.
Strongly

0

Strongly

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Disagree
1

2

3

Agree

4

5

6

1. The victim is partly to blame for the actions of the defendant.

_.___ 2. The defendant is solely t9 blame for the events that took place in the bar tht.1.t
evening.
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3. The defendant's actions arc not the results of the victim's sex (gender).
4. The defendant's actions were reasonable.
5. The victim should know to be more careful about approaching someone
they do not know in a bar.
6. The defendant's actions were the result of unwanted advances hy the ·tictim.

_ _ 7. The defendant deliberately intended to inflict injury on the victim.
8. The defendant's actions were under his control.
9. Tur, defendant was provoked.
10. The defendant's actions were justified.

l 1. The victim deserved it.
12. Any reasonable man would have acted the same as the defendant.
13. The defendant is mentally unstable.
_ _ .14. The victim is mentally unstable.

15. The defendant committed a hate crime.

Personal Decision
Juror#

1. Please list, as briefly as possible, the reasons for your personal d~;jsion in this case.
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Appendix G
Classification Schema; Study 2
Statements made by participants from the Personal Decision questionnaire were classified
into six types of arguments used to support their decision in the case. This table provides
examples of statements made.

1. Legal Arguments
Guilty
"Her violent assault was without question an assault with intent to harm."
"Self-defense is not a good enough excuse for beating another person
unconscious."

Not Guilty
"Not enough evidence to decide guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
"Not guilty of a hate crime/bias because she didn't seek him out to injure
him."

2. Physical Evidence
Guilty
"He should be punished for physically hurting someone else."
"She used many derogatory terms."

Not Guilty
"People yell insulting and derogatory remarks at people all the time,
especially in bar situations."
"There isn't enough conclusive evidence that connects her to the crim~.
Three people witnessed her yelling and assaulting him but with the extent
of his injuries it couldn't be her.''

3. Morality Statements
Guilty

"She acted inappropriately."
"In any case, whether or not she was forcing herself on him, a man should
not hit a woman, he should be able to control himself."
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Not Guilty
"She was frightened and panicked. She did it as a means for him to get
away from her."
"He no doubt attacked her. Maybe having a bad week."

4. Vid im-Related Statements
Guilty
"No violence toward a woman that is that extreme should go unpunished.
She is.far weaker than him."
"The only thing the man did was touch her arm when she didn't want to be
touched."
Not Guilty
"He was hitting on her in an obscene way."
"Advances from the girl means she tried to get him so it shouldn't be his
fault. She is trying to exploit the situation."

5. Witness and/or Perpetrator CredibiHty
Guilty
"Just because he doesn't remember what happened doesn't make him not
guilty."
"A number of witnesses saw the incident describing him hitting her."
Not Guilty
"Her friend claimed she was a calm, loyal, caring individual."
"Never attacked a woman before. Maybe he mistook the situation."
6. Extra-Legal Factors
Guilty
"The alcohol influenced his anger."
"He was at another bar and didn't freak out."
Not Guilty
"Both had been drinking."
"It could have been the result of too much alcohol."

104

Appendix H
Transcript
Note: This transcript depicts the condition in which participants will read about a samesex attack by a man against a gay man that has been labeled "assault motivated by bias or
a hate crime" and has taken place in a local bar (i.e., not a gay bar) and where
"provocation" on the part of the victim was present.
*Details oflocation that will change depending upon condition appear in italics.
**Details of presence or absence of "provocation" that will change depending upon

condition appear in ho/ti italics.
Juclge's Opening Statement
Judge: Good afternoon. This proceeding is a trial of the defendant, Mr. Daniel Smith,
\.Yho has been charged with assault motivated by bias or a hate crime perpetrated against
Mr. James Grear. Mr. Smith is being prosecuted by the District Attorney's office for
committing assault mofr,/ated by bias or a hate crime against Mr. Grear. Mr. Smith will
be represented by his lawyer. We will hear.opening statements from the prosecution and
defense. This wiB be followed by direct examination of the prosecution's witnesses and
cross examination by the defense. Direct examination of the defense witnesses and cross
examination of those witnesses by the prosecution will follow. Each wiH give closing
statements.

The issue at this trial is whether Mr. Smith committed assault motivated by bias or a hate
crime againstMr. Grear during the evening of May 29th, 2005 at a do'WiltO\vn ·
Minneapolis,~ bar. The defenda.11t pleaded not guilty. Before the defendant can be
convicted, the State must prove all the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. .The fact that the defendant has been charged with a criminal offense is
not evidence and must notbe considere<l by you as evidence.
Assault motivated by bias is defined by this state in the following statute:

609.221 Great bodily harm. Whoever assaults another with intent to inflict great bodily .
harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more that1 20 years or to payment of a
fine of not more than $30,000, or both. Plus:
Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act (28 U.S.C 994)
Congress enacted a federal complement to state hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes
in the 1994 crime bill. This provision required the United States Sentencing Commission
to increase the penalties for crimes in which the victim was selected "because of the
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actual or perceived race, color, religion~ national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or
sexual orientation of any person." This measure applies to attacks and vandalism which

occur in national parks and on federal property.
609.2231 Assaults motivated by bias. (a) Whoever assaults another because of the
victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexua! orkntation,
disability as defined in section 363A.03, age, or national origin may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000,
or both.
363A.03 Sexunl orientation. "Sexual orientation" means having or being perceived as
having an. emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to ci.nother person without regard
to the sex of that person or having or being perceived as having an orientation for such
attachment, or having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not
traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness. "Sexual
orientation" does not include a physicaJ_ or sexual attachment to children by an adult

After all evidence has been heard,. you will be required to vote on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
Prosecution's Opening Statement
Members of the jury, Mr. Grear will tell you how Mr. Srnith assaulted him without
provocation or apparent regard for anyone in his way. He will also tell you how Mr.
Smith shouted slanderous and derogatory remarks toward him during this attack. Mr.
Grear along with two other witnesses at the bar that evening will testify to the horrific
natu~e of the crime. This, ladies and gentlemen, is a clear case of assault motivated by
bias. 'T'his crime is a hate crime given the rea'5on Mr. Grear was attacked is because of his
perceived sexual orientation.

Defense's Opening Statement
Members of the jury, my client, Mr. Smith has been charged with assault motivated by
bias. We wiJ.1 show that there is no evidence whatsoever to find Mr. Smith guilty of a
hate crime. Instead, we will show that Mr. Smith was merely defending himself against
the unwanted sexual advances of Mr. Grear and did not intend to cause bodily harm.
This case does not constitute assault motivated by bias.

Judge: Prosecution, call your first witness.
Prosecution: The state calls Mr. James Grear to the stand.
ProsecuHon Direct Examination of Mr. Grear
P: Mr. Grear can you tell us in your own words what happened the night of May 29th,
2005?
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JG: Yes. Some friends of mine and I dedded to go out, have a few drinks, a little fun,
nothing too crazy, maybe a little dancing. We went to this place I'd never been to before,
the********. It was pretty nice when we first got there, we had a drink and my friends
went out on the dance floor to dance. I de~ided to walk around and see if there were any
interesting people, you know. Um, then when my friends came back I was pointing out
this guy that had smiled at me while I was walking around. I said that I thought he was
pretty cute. My friends encourag1;d me to go talk to him but I was too shy at first. I
passed by him again late1 on and he smiled and nodded so I said "hi" and just kept
walking. I wish I would have left at that point.

P: So what happened next, Mr. Grear?
JG: I :finally got up the courage to go talk to him. I walked over when he was only
talking to one other person ... I didn't want to interrupt their conversation so I waited. I
said "hello" and asked him if I could buy him a drink. He seemed a little surprised at

first, but then he said "sure". After I introduced myself we talketl about wltat we do for
a living,for fun, you know, just tryillg to get to know each other, I thought... then a
slow song Cflme on, one that I really like. 1 put my arm aro11nd him and asked him to
dance. He pulled away from me and when he turned backaround he punched me in the
stomach. I was so surprised that I just stood there. The bar was so crowded that I don't
think anyone even saw what had happened. Then he started yelling at me, things like, "I
don'tdance with fags" and "Keep your queer hands off me) you homo". Then he just
started hitting me over and over again. I backed away and put my rums up, but I couldn't
go very far, there were too many people for me to get away from him qtlickly. At some
point I fell to the ground and the crowd sort of gathered around me anct just watched him
hitting and kicking me. Some girl got hit in the process of trying to get in the way of his
punches. Eventually I blacked out and don't remember anything until I woke up in the
emergency room at the hospital.
P: Did Mr. Smith use

3.

weapon of any sort, other than his fist when he was hitting you?

JG: I don't Jr.now. I remember that he had a drink in his hand and I was told at the
hospital that they pulled glass out of my arms, but I'm not sure if he hit me with the glass,
or if there was just glass on the floor when I fell or what.
P: What injuries were you treated for at the hospital?

JG: I had two broken ribs, a broken finger, a broken nose, a concussion, and many cuts
and bruises.
P: Did you receive any stitche~ for the cuts?

.JG: Yes. All together I got 150 stitches in my face, neck, head, and arms.

P: .Mr. Grear, why do you think Mr. Smith attackeu you?
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JG: I'm not sure. Everything seemed fine and then all of a sudden he just lost it. Prom
the things he was yelling at me, I would say that I was attacked because I am a gay man.
P: Mr. Grear, do you think this was a hate crime?
JG: Yes, definitely.
P: Thank you Mr. Grear. No further questions.

Defense Crvss Examination of Mr. Gr-ear
D: Mr. Grear, you just testified that you are a gay man. Was the bar you were at
considered a gay bar?

JG: No, I guess not.

D= Would you say that you were "hitting on" Mr. Smith at this bar?

JG: No. I mean, I tJ10ught he was attractive and I was curious ifhe was interested or
not, but I didn't ask for his number or ask him out for a date or anything like that.
D: But you did ask him to slow dance with you?
JG: Yes.
D: When you were speaking with Mr. Smith before 'lsking him to dance did you touch
him in any way?
JG: I put my arm around l,im before I asked him to dance. It was loud in the bar with
the music and everything so we had to stand very close to carry on a conversation.

D: Did Mr. Smith touch you at all during this conversation?
JG: I don't remember.
D: ·what was your intention in speaking with Mr. Smith and asking ldm to dance?
JG: I guess to find out if he was interested in me or not.

D: Interested how? Sexually?
JG: Romantically maybe, but not sexually. For a possible date. I wnsn 't trying 10 take
anyone home with me that night.

108

D: Couldn't you have just asktd him if he was interested frorn the start of the
conversation?
JG: I suppose, that just seems a little awkward.

D: Mr. Grear have you approached men in bars that you know to not be co11sidered gay

bars before?
JG: Yes.

D: And how have these men responded to your advances?
JG: Depends. Sometimes 1 get a date. Sometimes they say ''no thank you". Sometimes
they get upset and tell me to "fuck-off".

D: So you haven't always been met with approval in these types of settings?
JG: No. But J don't think anyone alway.~ is.

D: Isn't it a greater risk to you knowing that the person you're hitting on may not be
gay?
JG: I don't think it makes a difference. If you're not interested, you're not interested~
regardless of sexual orientation. It's a risk everyone takes if they're trying to find out if
someone's interested in them or not.

D: You testified that at some point you passed out and don't remember anything after
that, correct?
JG: Yes.

D: Is it possible that someone other than my dient rr. ,~y have attacked you?
JG: I only saw Mr. Smith hit me.

D: \Vhat about after you passed out?
JG: I guess it's possible.

D: Thank you. No further questions.
Prosecution Direct Examination of Witness #1: M»·. Aian navis - Bartender
P: Mr. Dav;s~ were you working at the ********on the night of May 29tl', 2005?

AD: Yes, I was tending bar at the South ent~ ance.
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P: Can you tell me if you recognize the victim, Mr. Grear and defendant, Mr. Smith
from that evening?
AD~ Yes. I remember both quite well.

P: Can you tell the cou..rt what you saw happen that night?
AD: Well, I didn't notice them talking or anything until they ordered drinks from me,
Mr. Grear is actually the one who ordered both drinks. After that I didn't pay much
attention to them, other than to notice that they wer(i talking. A while later I heard Mr.
Smith yelling at Mr. Grear. At first I assumed they were a couple having a fight and then
I saw Mr. Smith punching Mr. Grear. I immediately called for bouncers to come bre~.k it
up and tried to get around the bar to help Mr. Grear who was lying on the floor by now. I
saw Mr. Smith punch and kick him repeatedly. I saw somegfrl in the crowd try to break
it up and she got hit as well. By the time the bouncers got through the crowd h was
obvicnm thatMr. Grear wns not conscious so J cal\ ·, the ambulance right away. Then I
helped try to clear the crowd out and waited near Mr. Grear until the EMTs arrived.

P: Did you hear anything thatwas said between Mr. Grear and the defen~ant?
AD: I only heard what Mr; Smith was yelling.
P: What did you hear Mr. SmJth yell?
AD: He called Mr. Grear a fag and to1d him to keep his queer hands cffhim.

P: Did you see anyone else hit or kick Mr. Grear?
AD: No, not that I could tell through the crowd.
P: Did you see Mr. Grear hit Mr. Smith in an attempt to fight back or otherwise?

AD: No.
P: Thank you Mr. Davis.
Defense Cross Examination nf \Vitness #1 ~ Mr. Alan Davis - Bartender

D: Mr. Davis, how long have you worked at the********?
AD: Three years.

D: Have you seen many fights ~n your bar in those three years?
AD: I guesr, so. Fights occur I'd say about once every couple nf weeks.
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D: Anyone ever taken to the hospital?
AD: Yes ... it's our policy to call an ambulance if there is any blood c;r if anyone is
unconscious.

D: Did you hear the conversation bt~tween 1'.fr. Grear and my client, J\.1r. Smith?
AD: No, I didn't hear anything they were talking about : . :.~til Mr. Smith starting yelling
obscenities at Mr. Grear.
D: Thank you Mr. Davis. No further questions.

Prosecutfo~,. Direct Examination of Witness #2: Ms. Isabel Salva

P~ Ms. Salva., were you at the **** 0

** the night of May 291h, 2005?

18: Yes.
P: Did you see Mr. Grear and the defendant there that night?

IS: Yes J. did.
P: Can you tell the court what you sav1 relevant to these proceedh~gs that evening?
.IS: I was standing at the bar near Mr. Smith most of the evening. I saw Mr. Grear come
over ai,d start taJ.king to him.. Then he started to yell at him. · I got ldnd of nervous
because I was standing so close that I couldn't move out of the way when he sort of
shove<i h~m. Then Mr. Smiihjust <.:tarting hittirrg anci kicking him. After he fell to the
ground, I could see he was bleeding and no one was trying to help, so I stepped in the
\vay of IV1r. Smith and tried to get him to stop. I kept telling him '"it's not worth it, you'll
get arrested". But then he hit me and kept kicking Mr. Grear.
P: Did you sustain any injuries as a result of try::ng to help Mr. Grear?

{S: Y i.:!s, I h!\d a cut above my e~,c that I hct.d to get stitches for at the hospital.
P: Uid yo i.~ see an.yor1e else hit or kick Mr. Grear?

IS: No.

P: Wby do you think Mr. Smith was attacking Mr. Grear?

lS: Because he's gay.
P: What mt1dc you think that was the reason?

lU

IS: Bec;ause of what he was yelling at him. He kept caJling him a fag and a queer and

stuff like that.
P: Ms. Salva, would consider ihis to be a hate crime?
IS: Y~s.
P: Th~mk you, no further questions.

Defense Cross Examination of 'Witil.ess #2: Ms. Isabel Salva
D: Ms. Salwi, you testified that you hari been at the bm.· for a while that night, correct?

lS: Yes.

D: Were you Jriflking alcohol at the bm· '.hat night?
IS: Yes. P· .i a few drinks.

D: Would you say ycu were intoxicated at the time the fight broke out?
IS: Um, probably. They wouldn't let me drive home frcm the hospital becalise I was
over the legal limit.

D~ Did you bear Mr. Grear ask my client to <lane~?
IS: No. But I dict htar him a~k Mr. Smith ifhe could ·i,uy him a drink.
D: Ho\v would you describe my cH~nt's behavior after the fight broke out?
IS: It was scary. Like he didn't even see or hear me when I was trying to talk to him.
He just kept hitting amt kicking, like he wan in a trance or something. He ~wemed very
angry.

D: Thank you Ms. Salva~
Defense Dire~t Examinutfon of.Defendant: Mr. Smith

D: Mr. Smith, C::\tl you please tell the court in your own words what happenedthe night
of May 29th, 2005 at the******** in Minneapolis?
DS: Yes. I went out with a couple of friends to a different club at first~ t11ey were trying
to set me up with !his chic, but I wasn't interested so we left. \\Then we got to the
******** I had already had a few drinks, we were just having a good time. Then this
man comes up to me and asks if he can buy me a drink. I noticed earlier that he ,,vas with
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a couple of cute girls so I thought maybe one of them was interested and sent their friend
over to talk to me. So he starts a.'aking me all these questions about myself tlten. he
starts touching my arm and leaning in clm;er to talk to me. I started to get a ltttk
uncomfortable so I back,:d up next to the bar a bit. The11 he pu! !tis arm otound me am/

asked me to dance to a slow song am! 1 realhed tlrut he was hitting on me! Well I>m no
fag, so I told i1im that and I guess I must of hit him when I turned around. But he still
wouldn't leave. He W?5 completely freaking me out. I tho1Jght he was going to grab me
and try to kiss me or something and then I just lost it. I mean he obviously wouldn't take
"no" for an answer.

D: Whathappenedthen?
DS: I don't rem~Lober. I just flipped out and I can kind of remember yelling and then
when the b0uncers grabbed me I remember seeing rum lying on the ground ... but all the
stuff in be&·"'.:~n w, 3 just anger. I just wanted him to leave :-w~ alon~.

D~ Why didn't you jm!'.. ..,d him you weren't interested?
DS: I did. I told him to get his hands off me, but he still wouidn 't leave.
D: Did you intend to harm Mr. Grear?

DS: No, I just felt scared and wanted him to go away.
D: Do you remember hitting Ms. Salva?

DS: No. I don't remember seeing her there at all.

D: Were you s1tJrprised tltat Mr. Grear asked you io da11ce?
DS: Hell yeah. We weren't in a gay bar or anything ... maybe tfwe were Iwouid've
t·xpected it ur something, but I thought he wu., asking me questions for one of his frltnds;
D: Thank you Mr. Smith, no further questions.

Pros~cution Cross Examination of Defendant: Mr. Smith

P: Mr. Smith you said that :10u had already had a couple of drinks before you got to the

*******\ correct?
DS: Yes.
P: Did you have too much to drink th?.t nip.ht?

DS: No. I wasn't wasted or nnything.
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P: You testified that you don't remember part of the e'1ening. Did you black out?

DS: I guess so.
P: If you don't think you had too much tu drjnk, what do you think caused you to biack
out?

DS: I'm not sure, I W8.s pretty pissed off, maybe l was just too angry.

P: Do you hate gay men?
DS: No. I don't hate them. I don't agree \Vith their lifestyle, but as long as they don't
-push it on me, they' re fine.

P: Did you feel that Mr. Grear was pushing his Hlifestyle" on you that evenjng?

DS: Ycs. He was hitting on me.
P: And this made you angry?
DS: Well, more like scared.

P: But you blacked out because you were angry?
DS: When he hit on me I was scared, but when he wouldn't leave me alone, I got angry.
P: I see. Mr. Smith you said that you were at a different bar earlier where you were not
intoresi:ed in someone e]se. Did this person scare you as well?

DS: No.

P: So you didn't get angry at her and hit her?

DS: No.
P: 'Nhy didn't she scare you?
DS! Because she was a woman ... not a gay guy.

P: After Mr. Grear fell to the floor and became unconscious why did you continue to hit

hi m.?
DS: I don't remember doing that.

P: Do you consider yourself to be homophobic Mr. Smith?
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DS: No~ I have a couple of friends who are gay .

.P: But if a gay man hits on you this makes you feel scared?
DS: Yeah, I just didn't know what to do.
P: You couldn't think of another way to handle th.e situation other than beating hirn to
the point of w1consciousness ami later hospit::.lization°
DS: I alrendy said I don't remember doing that.
P: Mr. Smith do you think this was a hate crime?
DS: No way, I don't hate people just because they're different than me, even ifl don't
agree with what they do.

P: Thank you, No further questions.
Defense Direct Examination of Wxtuess #3: Mr. Alex Harris ... Friend

D: Mr. Harris~ can
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please tell us how you know the defendant?

AH: Dan and I are good friends. We've known each other for about four years.

D: Were you out whh Mr. Smith the night of May 29tn7

AH: Yes.
D: Did you see him talking with Mr. Grear?

AH:

Yf:!S.

D: How would you describe hi3 actions after the fight broke out?
AH: I've never seen him like that. He seemed completely freaked out.
D: Have you ever seen him in a fight before?

AH: No, never. He can always find a reason to walk away.
D: Why do you think this fight happened?

AH: I don't know. It had to be something big for him to go off like that

D: What kind of person would you characterize Mr. Smith to be?
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AH~ A good pr,rson. He is very caring, loyal, and he loves his family. He's just an all ..
around great friend.
D: Would you consider Mr. Smith l, ~, be homophobic?
AH: No. I've never heard him say a bad thing about homosexuals.
D: Thank you Mr. Hanis.

Pros£cution C~·os:;; Examination of Witness #3: 1\ilr. Alex Harris - Friend

.P: Mr. Hards, you hzve known the <lefendant for four years and he hali never been in a
fight that you know of?

AH: Nothing bigger than an argument.

P: You said that he ~'freaked out'', what do you mean by that?
AH: I-fo just didn't seem like himself, like he was in a rage or something.

P: To your knowledge has Mr. Smith ever been hit on by a member of the same sex prior
to May 29 1h?
.
AH: Yeah. at a gay bar we went to with some fem"Je friends once

P: And how did he react in that situation?
AH: He seemed fine. He made jokes about jt and w~ so1t of teased him a little.
P! He made jokes about it? What kind of jokes?
AH: Nothing bad, just how he's hot enough to attract members of both sexes. Stuff like

that.
P: Was he polite to the person that hit on him then?

AH: Yeah. He just said he was straight and the man left him alone.
P: IVfr. Smith testified that he disagrees with the lifestyle of gay men and lesbians. Why
would he go to a gay bar?
AH: We went for a friend's birthday party.

P: Mr. Harris, why didn't you do anything to stop the attack on Mr. Grear that night?
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AH: At first l didn't know what was happening and I wasn't sure why tL':' fight had
started in the first place. Atlcr he fell to the ground l tried to get over to Dan to talk him
down, but the crowd was too full and I couldn't get tlu·ougb.
P: Thank you. No further questions.
F rosecution Closing Statement
Ladies and gentlemen ofthejury, there is no dispute that Mr. Smith violently attacked
1\fl.u. Grear the night of May 29th, 2005. All of the witnesses here, including :Mr. Srruth's
ovvn friend, saw him and unly him, hit and kick Mr. Grear repeatedly. Mr. Grear incurred
a number of i~iuries and spent a few days in the hospital as a result of this attack. Both
Mr. Grear and two other witnes.3es testified to the slanderous and derogatory remarks that
be s>,outed toward his victim before and during the attack. Ladies and gentlemen, Hus
clearly shows intent on the part of Mr. Smith to inflict harm on his victim. After hearing
the words that were shouted during the atiack, there should be no doubt that Mr. Smifa is
guilty of assault motivated by bias and according to the hate crime sentencing
enhancement act, should be punished accordingly. Thank you for your time.

Defense Closi:ng Statement

J wy members, although others present that eveniA1.g say they witnessed my <.;lient
attac1'ing Mr~ Grear, he does not remember that at al1. Ladies and gentlemen, my client
was so frighten.ed and eventually angered by the actinns of Mr. Grear that he simply
reacted poorly to a bad situation. My client, Mr. Smic:1 did not intend to harm Mr. Grear.
His only intention was to defend himself against the sexual advances of a gay man. This
case lacks the intent neederl to constitute ass.:1.ult. Furthermore, this case is not a hate
crime as my clie~1t did not seek out Mr. Grear because he was gay. He simply wanted
hi11. . to leave him alone. I am certain that you will find my client, Ivfr. Smith not guilty.
Thank you.

Judge~s Closing Statement
Members of the jmy, you have heard all the arguments presented by both the District
A ttorr:ey and defense lawyer and are now required to come to a decision regarding the
guilt or innocence of Mr. Smith.
Jury members are reminded that in order to find Mr. Smith guilty of assault motivated by
bias or a hate crime, there must be sufficient evidence that there was intent to inflict gre~t
bodily hann to the victim and that the victim in this case w::is assaulted because of his
actual or perceived sexual orientation. The State must prove all of ~he essential elemerits
of the crime charged by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is not required to
prove guilt beyond all doubt, but beyond a reasonabh-! doubt.
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Appendix I
Questionnaires
Demographic Questionnaire
Pleas<: :rovide the followhg information:

Age:
Sex~

Female

Male
___Prefer not to say

Race:

African American / Black
Asian American
Caucasion / White
__
. Hispanic
Native American
- -Other:___Prefer n0t to say

: ,cxual Orientation:
Heterosexual
___Gayman
Lesbian
Bisexual
_ _Prefer not to say
Level of Education:
First Year
___ Sophomore

Junior
Senior

Grad Student
_ _Other/Prefer not to say

"Home" sta?·e (Le., state in which you have lived most of your lifo): _________

State you live in now:

118

Individual Juror Verdict
Juror Number:- - - - - On the basis of the evidence, my vote is that Daniel Smith is:
Guilty of Assault motivated. by bias (hate crime)
Not-guilty

Private Belief Rating Scale
Juror f:I.- - - - - \Vith this questionnaire, you are being asked to circle the one number that best describes
your private belief that Daniel Smith should or should not be convic.ted of assault. You
are not being asked to state whether you believe there is sufficient evidence to convict in
a court of Jaw. Rather, it is asking about your personal and pri'",a.tc bdicf.

Please circle one number that best describes your private belief about whether Daniel
Smith should or should not be convicted.
-"
j
-5
-4
Certain Daniel Smith
Should NOT BE
Convicted

-2

-1

0

+1

+2

+5
+3
+4
Certain Daniel Smith
SHOULD BE
Convicted

Perceptions

.! urc.. Number:- - - - - Given the following rating scale, ple:ase indicate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with the follO\ving statements.
Strongly
Disagree
0

Strongly
Agree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. The victim is partly to blame for the actions of the defendant.

2. The defendant is solely to blame for the events that took place in the bar that
evening.
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,;,•

3. The defendant's actions are not the result.s of the victim's sexual orientation.
4. The defendant's actions were rea~onable.
____ 5. The victim should know to be more careful about approaching someone
whose :;exual orientation is unknown.
6. The defendant's actions were the r~sult of unwanted advances by the victim.
7. The defendant deliberately intended to inflict injury on the victim.
8. The defendant's actions were under his control.
- · - 9. The defendant was prov0ked.
10. The defendant's actions were justified.
11. The vidim deserved it.
12. Any reasonable man would have acted the same as the defendant.
13. 'The defendant is mentally unstable.
_ _ 14. The victim is mentally unstable.

15. The defendant committed a hate crime.
Personal Decision

Juror#- - - -

1. Please list, as briefly as possible, the reasons for your personal decision in this case.
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Appeudix·J
Classification Schema; Study 3
Statements made by participants from the Persvnal Decision que5tionnaire 1Nere classifie0.
into six types of arguments used to support their decision in the case. This table provides
examples of statements made.

1. Legal Arguments
Guilty
"He obviously attacked him with intent to severely hurt hlm~"
"Not considered self-defense.''

Not Guilty
"He did not seek hi· 11 out and ask him if he was gay, it wasn't his intent to

hmm."
"He was being defensive."
2. Physical Evidence

Guilty
"He beat him unconscious while yelling obscenities."
"He did hit him."

Not Guilty
"I think more went on than just words exchanged between them.,,

3. Morality Statements

Guilty
"I don "t think it is right for someone to get hurt bec,qu~~ they were hitting

on them."
"You can't just go beat someone because they me gay."
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4. Victim-Rch1tcd Statement.~

Guilty
·
"No one saw the vfotim do anything wrong.,.
"No harmful actions initiated by -vi<..tim.n
Not Guilty

.

"He dicJn't feel comfortable with a gay pushing his lifestyle on him. 'When
he didn't go away, he go~ upset and defensive like any mau would."
"Tie victim should go to gay bars if he is lonking for men."
5. Witue~s and/or Perpetrator CredibHity
Guilty

HHe could have avoided harming him if h1~ had the ability tc, control
himself~"

·'Claiming be didn't hn

1

.

;·.,...,

people but his actions showed differently."

Not Guilty
"Th~ friend's account of what the defendant is realiy like."
"I-fo had been hit on by gay men before and did not have a )'.)rob Iem.,,

6. Extra-Legal Factors
Guilty

"He shouldn't have acted that Nay at a gay bar."
"The attack was unprovoked."
Not Guilty
"It is an awkward situation and he probably had too much to drink."
"Something must have been (bn~ to p!ovokc such a brutal attack."
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